Publications

Perception of risk/behavioral perspective

No abstract is provided for this article.

High Stakes Decision Making: Normative, Descriptive and Prescriptive Considerations

This paper reviews the state of the art of research on individual decision-making in high-stakes, low-probability settings. A central theme is that resolvi

When does explicit justification impair decision making?

The idea that careful analysis leads to better decisions is pervasive in research on decision making. Intriguingly, results raise the possibility that thinking about reasons for decisions before deciding may degrade decision quality. This paper reports the results of a laboratory study which examined whether task characteristics critically influence the effects of thinking about reasons on decision quality. We found that explicit reasoning degraded judgement quality, objectively measured, on an 'intuitive' task. However, we also found that explicit reasoning enhanced performance on an 'analytic' task. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks

Human beings have always been intuitive toxicologists, relying on their senses of sight, taste, and smell to detect harmful or unsafe food, water, and air. As we have come to recognize that our senses are not adequate to assess the dangers inherent in exposure to a chemical substance, we have created the sciences of toxicology and risk assessment to perform this function. Yet despite this great effort to overcome the limitations of intuitive toxicology, it has become evident that even our best scientific methods still depend heavily on extrapolations and judgments in order to infer human health risks from animal data. Many observers have acknowledged the inherent subjectivity in the assessment of chemical risks and have indicated a need to examine the subjective or intuitive elements of expert and lay risk judgments. Such an examination was begun by surveying members of the Society of Toxicology and the lay public about basic toxicological concepts, assumptions, and interpretations. The results demonstrated large differences between toxicologists and laypeople, as well as differences among toxicologists working in industry, academia, and government. In addition, toxicologists were found to be sharply divided in their opinions about the ability to predict a chemical's effect on human health on the basis of animal studies. These results place the problems of risk communication in a new light. Although the survey identifies misconceptions that experts should clarify for the public, it also suggests that controversies over chemical risks may be fueled as much by limitations of the science of risk assessment and disagreements among experts as by public misconceptions.

The Fear of Personal Death and the Willingness to Commit to Organ Donation

In three studies, with samples from different countries (the United States and Israel) and religions (Christians and Jews), we found that individual levels of fear of death significantly predicted lower willingness to register as organ donors (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, after being asked about their organ donation status (i.e., whether they are registered as donors), fear of death significantly increased among unregistered people. This did not occur among registered people, who had already faced the decision to become donors in the past (Study 2). Finally, providing non-registered (non-religious) people with a defense strategy to manage their fear of death increased their willingness to sign an organ donation commitment, partially by increasing their feelings of hopefulness. The implications of these findings for increasing organ donation registration are discussed.

Only new laws will spur seat-belt use [Editorial]

No abstract is provided for this article.

Moral preferences in helping dilemmas expressed by matching and forced choice

This paper asks whether moral preferences in eight medical dilemmas change as a function of how preferences are expressed, and how people choose when they are faced with two equally attractive help projects. In two large-scale studies, participants first read dilemmas where they “matched” two suggested helping projects (which varied on a single attribute) so that they became equally attractive. They did this by filling in a missing number (e.g., how many male patients must Project M save in order to be equally attractive as Project F which can save 100 female patients). Later, the same participants were asked to choose between the two equally attractive projects. We found robust evidence that people do not choose randomly, but instead tend to choose projects that help female (vs. male), children (vs. adult), innocent (vs. non-innocent), ingroup (vs. outgroup) and existing (vs. future) patients, and imply no (vs. some) risk of a harmful side-effect, even when these projects have been matched as equally attractive as, and save fewer patients than the contrasting project. We also found that some moral preferences are hidden when expressed with matching but apparent when expressed with forced choice. For example, 88–95% of the participants expressed that female and male patients are equally valuable when doing the matching task, but over 80% of them helped female patients in the choice task.

Are trivial risks the greatest risks of all?

Studies by Sjöberg published in 1999 (Journal of Risk Research), Volume 2, Number 2, pp. 129-49) have led him to conclude that perceived risk is mostly determined by probability of harm, whereas risk reduction demands are mostly determined by severity of harm and not probability. As a result, he finds that perceived risk does not predict demand for mitigation, leading him to question the value of the perceived risk construct. Sjöberg's results conflict with an extensive literature demonstrating (a) that protective behaviours are influenced by both probability and severity of harm and (b) that perceived risk is a strong predictor of desire for risk reduction. Why do Sjöberg's results conflict with this literature? The answer is to be found in the idiosyncrasies of his research designs and interpretations. In Study 1, Sjöberg asked people to judge the risk of adverse and sometimes trivial outcomes, leading his respondents to think of risk as the probability of those outcomes. In Study 2, he asked people to evaluate insurance against relatively probable losses, failing to test the hypothesis that probability thresholds trigger insurance purchases. Sjöberg's conclusions are thus misleading. For the purpose of understanding and predicting people's concerns, their desires for risk reduction, and their protective behaviours, it would be unwise to discard the concept of perceived risk.

Behavioral decision theory perspectives on protective behavior

What determines whether people will protect themselves against the severe losses that might arise from some rare hazard? What factors underlie the perception and acceptability of risks associated with technology? The answers to questions such as these are vital for understanding how people cope with threats from accidents, diseases, and natural hazards and for helping them manage their lives more effectively in the face of such risks. The role that the study of judgment and decision processes can play in providing answers to these questions will be explored in this chapter. Experiments concerning insurance decisions, risk perception, and evaluation of technological risks will be described, and the implications of this research for matters of public safety and health will be discussed.

Worry, Risk Perceptions, and the Willingness to Act to Reduce Medical Errors

The Nevada Initiative: A Risk Communication Fiasco

The U.S. Congress has designated Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the only potential site to be studied for the nation's first high‐level nuclear waste repository. People in Nevada strongly oppose the program, managed by the U.S. Department of Energy. Survey research shows that the public believes there are great risks from a repository program, in contrast to a majority of scientists who feel the risks are acceptably small. Delays in the repository program resulting in part from public opposition in Nevada have concerned the nuclear power industry, which collects the fees for the federal repository program and believes it needs the repository as a final disposal facility for its high‐level nuclear wastes. To assist the repository program, the American Nuclear Energy Council (ANEC), an industry group, sponsored a massive advertising campaign in Nevada. The campaign attempted to assure people that the risks of a repository were small and that the repository studies should proceed. The campaign failed because its managers misunderstood the issues underlying the controversy, attempted a covert manipulation of public opinion that was revealed, and most importantly, lacked the public trust that was necessary to communicate credibly about the risks of a nuclear waste facility.

The prominence effect in health-care priority setting

People often choose the option that is better on the most subjectively prominent attribute — the prominence effect. We studied the effect of prominence in health care priority setting and hypothesized that values related to health would trump values related to costs in treatment choices, even when individuals themselves evaluated different treatment options as equally good. We conducted pre-registered experiments with a diverse Swedish sample and a sample of international experts on priority setting in health care (n = 1348). Participants, acting in the role of policy makers, revealed their valuation for different medical treatments in hypothetical scenarios. Participants were systematically inconsistent between preferences expressed through evaluation in a matching task and preferences expressed through choice. In line with our hypothesis, a large proportion of participants (General population: 92%, Experts 84% of all choices) chose treatment options that were better on the health dimension (lower health risk) despite having previously expressed indifference between those options and others that were better on the cost dimension. Thus, we find strong evidence of a prominence effect in health-care priority setting. Our findings provide a psychological explanation for why opportunity costs (i.e., the value of choices not exercised) are neglected in health care priority setting.

People who are bad with numbers often find it harder to make ends meet – even if they are not poor

Perceived Risks of Radioactive Waste Transport Through Oregon: Results of a Statewide Survey

Transportation of hazardous materials, and particularly radioactive wastes, on public highways has become an important risk management issue. The unfavorability of public attitudes regarding hazardous and nuclear wastes signals the potential for strong public opposition to programs for transporting these materials. This paper presents the results of a survey conducted to assess public reactions to a long‐term nuclear waste transport program planned to follow a route through a portion of rural Oregon. The survey assessed a number of key risk perception issues, including perceived health and safety risks of nuclear waste transport, relative risks of transport vs. storage at an existing site, trust in state officials, and satisfaction with life in communities along the transport route. The survey identified a number of attitudes and concerns that need to be understood and considered by those in charge of designing and implementing the waste‐transportation program.

Role of Trust in Risk Perception and Risk Management, April 1992

Regulation of experienced and anticipated regret in daily decision making.

Decisions were sampled from 108 participants during 8 days using a web-based diary method. Each day participants rated experienced regret for a decision made, as well as forecasted regret for a decision to be made. Participants also indicated to what extent they used different strategies to prevent or regulate regret. Participants regretted 30% of decisions and forecasted regret in 70% of future decisions, indicating both that regret is relatively prevalent in daily decisions but also that experienced regret was less frequent than forecasted regret. In addition, a number of decision-specific regulation and prevention strategies were successfully used by the participants to minimize regret and negative emotions in daily decision making. Overall, these results suggest that regulation and prevention of regret are important strategies in many of our daily decisions.

Explaining the processes behind identifiability and singularity effects on charitable giving

The social amplification of risk: assessing fifteen years of research and theory

More than a decade has elapsed since the introduction in 1988 of the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) by researchers from Clark University (Kasperson, Kasperson, Renn, and colleagues) and Decision Research (Slovic and colleagues). During that time various researchers have enlisted the framework to complete a substantial number of empirical studies. All the while, the emergence of a much larger body of relevant knowledge has spawned a lively debate on aspects of the framework. In this chapter we consider these developments, inquiring into refinements, critiques, and extensions of the approach, the emergence of new issues, and the findings and hypotheses growing out of fifteen years of empirical research.