730 publications from this institution
No abstract is provided for this article.
(1991). Risk Perception, Trust, and Nuclear Waste: Lessons from Yucca Mountain. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development: Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 6-30.
This paper re-examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on affect when judging the risk and benefit of specific hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and benefit judgments under a time-pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on affect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and confirmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall affective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an 'affect heuristic' which improves judgmental efficiency by deriving both risk and benefit evaluations from a common source—affective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views, controversy, and conflict have become pervasive. Research has begun to provide a new perspective on this problem by demonstrating the complexity of the concept ‘‘risk’’ and the inadequacies of the traditional view of risk assessment as a purely scientific enterprise. This paper argues that danger is real, but risk is socially constructed. Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. In addition, our social and democratic institutions, remarkable as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the risk arena. Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power. Scientific literacy and public education are important, but they are not central to risk controversies. The public is not irrational. Their judgments about risk are influenced by emotion and affect in a way that is both simple and sophisticated. The same holds true for scientists. Public views are also influenced by worldviews, ideologies, and values; so are scientists’ views, particularly when they are working at the limits of their expertise. The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the complex, sociopolitical nature of risk point to the need for a new approach—one that focuses upon introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision making in order to make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.
Risk communication takes place in a variety of forms, ranging from warning labels on consumer products to interactions among governmental officials, industry representatives, the media, and members of the public on such highly charged situations as Love Canal,...
Behavioral decision theory can contribute in many ways to the management and regulation of risk. In recent years, empirical and theoretical research on decision making under risk has produced a body of knowledge that should be of value to those who seek to understand and improve societal decisions. This paper describes several components of this research, which is guided by the assumption that all those involved with high-risk technologies as promoters, regulators, politicians, or citizens need to understand how they and the others think about risk. Without such understanding, well-intended policies may be ineffective, perhaps even counterproductive.
Citing public fear and mistrust, strong opposition to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository site, and less-than-exemplary performance by the Department of Energy (DOE), two private researchers believe present high-level radioactive waste-disposal plans may have to be scrapped. Government and the nuclear industry may have to start over. Policy makers should seek to develop new relationships with communities and states where suitable disposal sites exist. These relationships may require that citizen groups and local institutions be given unprecedented authority in locating and operating such facilities. Contrary to popular impressions, there is still time to take a new approach. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission says present on-site storage arrangements offer a safe alternative for 100 years or more. The sense of immediate crisis and cries for immediate solutions should be calmed and a more considered strategy brought to the public debate. For starters, the researchers propose that the problems of defense waste be separated from the problems of commercial waste. They also suggest that DOE be assigned responsibility for defense waste and a new agency be created to handle high-level commercial waste.
Three experiments demonstrate how the processing of negations is contingent on the evaluation context in which the negative information is presented. In addition, the strategy used to process the negations induced different affective reactions toward the stimuli, leading to inconsistency of preference. Participants were presented with stimuli described by either stating the presence of positive features (explicitly positive alternative) or negating the presence of negative features (non-negative alternative). Alternatives were presented for either joint (JE) or separate evaluation (SE). Experiment 1 showed that the non-negative stimuli were judged less attractive than the positive ones in JE but not in SE. Experiment 2 revealed that the non-negative stimuli induced a less clear and less positive feeling when they were paired with explicitly positive stimuli rather than evaluated separately. Non-negative options were also found less easy to judge than the positive ones in JE but not in SE. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that people process negations using two different models depending on the evaluation mode. Through a memory task, we found that in JE people process the non-negative attributes as negations of negative features, whereas in SE they directly process the non-negative attributes as positive features.
In the context of health, safety, and environmental decisions, the concept of risk involves value judgments that reflect much more than just the probability and consequences of the occurrence of an event. This article conceptualizes the act of defining and assessing risk as a game, in which the rules must be socially negotiated within the context of a specific problem. This contextualist view of risk provides insight into why technical approaches to risk management often fail with problems such as those involving radiation and chemicals, where scientific experts and the public disagree on the nature of the risks. It also highlights the need for allowing the interested and affected parties to define and play the game, thus emphasizing the importance of institutional, procedural, and societal processes in risk-management decisions.
Foresightful investment analysts have long recognized the need to understand more clearly the detailed processes underlying investment decisions-especially decisions made by acknowledged experts. For example, Bernhard observes that, if the mental processes of consistently successful investors are intuitional, that intuitional reasoning must be made understandable.' In a similar vein, others have argued that, by compelling the investment analyst to translate his vague attitudes, opinions, and reasons into explicit quantities, the analyst's thoughts are brought out into the open where they can be observed, evaluated, and tested.2 Researchers in the areas of economics, finance, and psychology have recently taken up the challenge of simulating and describing the judgment process. There are, at present, a number of methods that should be of interest to persons concerned with the dynamics of investment decisions. The objective of this paper is to provide a brief introduction to this work and to present an experiment that illustrates the use of one such method for quantitatively describing the use of information in investment decisions. Due to limitations of the sample of subjects and the particular cases being judged, the reader should view the experiment as a methodological illustration-not a finished empirical investigation.
No abstract is provided for this article.
Risk is perceived and acted on in 2 fundamental ways. Risk as feelings refers to individuals' fast, instinctive, and intuitive reactions to danger. Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on risk management. Reliance on risk as feelings is described with "the affect heuristic." The authors trace the development of this heuristic across a variety of research paths. The authors also discuss some of the important practical implications resulting from ways that this heuristic impacts how people perceive and evaluate risk, and, more generally, how it influences all human decision making. Finally, some important implications of the affect heuristic for communication and decision making pertaining to cancer prevention and treatment are briefly discussed.
