Publications

One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past two decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed-not merely revealed-in the process of elicitation.This conception is derived in part from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation often give rise to systematically different responses.These "preference reversals" violate the principle of procedure invariance fundamental to theories of rational choice and raise difficult questions about the nature of human values.If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist?Describing and explaining such failures of invariance will require choice models of far greater complexity than the traditional models.

No abstract is provided for this article.

Current health care policy emphasizes improving health outcomes and the ef- ficacy of health care delivery by supporting informed consumer choices. At the same time, health information often involves uncertainty, and many people may lack the skills and knowledge to process this information, manage their health and health care, and make in- formed choices. Innumeracy, an element of poor health literacy, is associated with the com- prehension and use of important health information. We review this literature and examine what can be done to help less numerate people act more effectively and take charge of

People perceive different types of radiation risks in very different ways. Surveys of the general public in the United States and elsewhere have consistently shown that people perceive nuclear power and nuclear waste as having high risk, but perceive other sources of radioactivity—such as medical x-rays and naturally occurring radon gas—as posing much lower risk. The majority of radiation experts see things quite differently, rating nuclear power and nuclear waste as less risky than the general public does, and perceiving medical x-rays and radon as more risky than generally believed. This perception gap demonstrates that acceptance of risk is conditioned by a number of factors, such as trust in the managers of the technology and appreciation for the direct personal benefits of the technology. Risk-communication strategies that help people place the risks of nuclear power and nuclear waste in perspective by comparing them with other risks can help reduce fears of radiation. Education about radiation can also affect risk perceptions and attitudes. Although differences between the perceptions of laypersons and those of experts cannot be attributed in any simple way to degree of knowledge, it is clear that better information about radiation and its consequences is needed. There is a particularly urgent need to develop plans and materials for communicating with the public in the event of a radiological disaster. The fear, anger, and distrust following the accident at Fukushima shows that communication is still a major problem.

How to assess and present analytic uncertainty to policymakers has emerged as an important topic in risk and policy analysis. Due to the complexity and deep uncertainty present in many forecasting domains, these reports are often fraught with analytic uncertainty. In three studies, we explore the effect of presenting probability assessments and analytic uncertainty through probability ranges. Participants were presented with mock intelligence forecasts that include narrative evidence as well as numerical probability assessments. Participants were sensitive to the ambiguity communicated through the confidence range. The narrative appeared to have a smaller effect on judgments when accompanied by a probability range as opposed to a point assessment. In one study, participants also thought that the probability range was more useful for decision making at a higher probability whereas the point estimate was more useful at a lower probability. When evaluating a forecast in hindsight, decisionmakers tended to report lower levels of blame and higher levels of source credibility for forecasts that reported ranges as compared to point assessments. These findings suggest that decisionmakers are not necessarily "ambiguity averse" in the forecasting context. Presenting ranges of probability may have distinct advantages as a way to communicate probability and analytic confidence to decisionmakers.

No abstract is provided for this article.

The singularity effect of identifiable victims is described as the greater willingness to help a single, identified victim than to help a group of victims with the same need (whether victims are identified or not), which occurs even when the single victim is 1 of the group's members. The current research examines the development of this phenomenon in early childhood examining children's actual sharing behavior from the ages of 3.8 to 8.2. Our results show that although younger children are overall less willing to share with others, they give more of their endowment to a group of recipients than to a single recipient. However, this tendency reverses for older children and children with higher level of Theory of Mind, who exhibit the singularity effect by giving more of their endowment to a single, identified target. We discuss possible mechanisms behind this developmental pattern. (PsycINFO Database Record

No abstract is provided for this article.

Choose from multiple link options via Crossref

In a previous paper, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) argued that variations in response mode cause fundamental changes in the way people process information, and thus alter the resulting decisions. Evidence supporting that view came from three experiments in which Ss chose their preferred bets from pairs of bets and later placed monetary values (prices) on each bet separately. In every pair of bets, one, designated the $ bet, featured a large amount to win; the other, called the P bet, featured a large probability of winning. Many Ss, after choosing a P bet, would frequently place a higher price on the $ bet. The authors hypothesized that the following process leads to such reversals of preference. When pricing an attractive bet, Ss use the amount to win as a natural starting point or anchor. Then they adjust downward the amount to win in order to incorporate the other aspects of the bet. This adjustment may be rather crude and insufficient, making the starting point – amount to win – the primary determiner of the response. Thus, the $ bets, with their large winning payoffs, receive higher prices than the P bets. This bias would not be expected in choice responses, where the amount to win does not dominate decisions (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968).

Perhaps the earliest studies of risk perception with regard to natural hazards were conducted by geographer Gilbert White (1945, 1964) and his students (e.g. Burton and Kates 1964). Later, in 1974, this author joined with White and economist Howard Kunreuther to...

Thirty subsystems constituting a functioning motor vehicle, including brake, steering, suspension, engine, electrical, and fuel systems, were evaluated by individuals on a set of risk characteristic scales. These included overall vehicle riskiness, manufacturer's anticipatory knowledge of system defects during vehicle design, likelihood of severe consequences in the event of system failure, controllability of the vehicle, and observability of impending failure. An analysis of the resulting judgments revealed two composite factors, one representing the controllability of consequences and the other representing observability. Both factors were highly related to judgments of risk, desire for risk regulation, and anticipated recall compliance. A comparison of risk judgments with accident data suggested that for some vehicle systems, particularly those serving a communication function in the driving task, drivers may underestimate the actual risk they face when system performance has degraded.

No abstract is provided for this article.

The measurement of the risk-related impacts from the siting of a high-level nuclear waste (HLNW) repository represents a new and important addition to conventional socioeconomic impact studies. In particular, the driving forces behind these impacts are the risks people perceive to be associated with the repository. Measuring the risk impacts requires a complementary set of approaches, of which, risk surveys are the cornerstone.a The purpose of these surveys is to provide scientifically defensible measures of the risk-related impacts. The risk surveys follow directly from a conceptual framework of how the HLNW repository affects peoples` perceptions and, ultimately, their behaviors. These surveys describe and measure: Characteristics of individuals, Risks people perceive from the HLNW repository, Views, or mind sets, they form about the HLNW repository, Changes in behaviors--e.g., changes in retirement decisions or industrial relocations--induced by the location of the repository, and Changes in well-being of Nevada citizens, if the repository were located at Yucca Mountain.

Forty-one high-school students evaluated each of 30 activities (e.g. smoking, drinking, drug use, sex) on each of 14 characteristics of perceived risk and perceived benefit. They also indicated whether they themselves engaged in the activities. Adolescents who participated in an activity perceived the risks to be smaller, better known, and more controllable than did non-participants. Participants also perceived greater benefits relative to risks, greater peer pressure to engage in the activity, and a higher rate of participation by others. Implications for theory, research, and for health education and intervention programs are discussed.

The natural way to deal with moral issues involving risk is to rely on our intuitive feelings. "How bad is it? Well, how bad does it feel?" We can also rely on reason to determine right and wrong but, as Jonathan Haidt has demonstrated, intuition comes first and dominates our responses unless we make an effort to critique and, if necessary, override it. We argue that our intuitive feelings are insensitive to large losses of life and thus mislead us in the face of natural disasters or human disasters associated with poverty, disease, and violence. Our intuitions seduce us into calmly turning away from these catastrophes, when we should be driven by outrage or sorrow to act. We propose ways to overcome this insensitivity through new forms of education and communication coupled with reliance on moral deliberation aimed at designing laws and institutions that compel attention to such problems.

People respond to the hazards they perceive. If their perceptions are faulty, efforts at personal, public, and environmental protection are likely to be misdirected. For some hazards, such as motor vehicle accidents, extensive statistical data are readily available. For other familiar activities, such as the consumption of alcohol and tobacco, assessment of risk requires complex epidemiological and experimental studies. However, even when statistical data are plentiful, the "hard" facts can only go so far toward developing policy. At some point, human judgment is needed to interpret the findings and determine their relevance.