994 publications from this institution
Cognitive evaluation theory (Chapter 5), derived in part from the work of Heider (1958) and de Charms (1968), distinguishes between an internal and external locus of causality. This distinction, which will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 10, is illustrated...
Human capabilities and happiness have received increasing attention from psychologists and economists over the past half-century. Implicit in such concepts are ideas such as thriving and flourishing—ideas that involve individuals having resources and opportunities to live healthy, full, and productive lives.
Depuis l’Antiquite, l’emploi inconsidere d’adjectifs, accuses d’affaiblir le style, est decourage par les prescipteurs du « bien ecrire », aussi bien en francais qu’en anglais. L’examen attentif de differents manuels a visee pedagogique, appuye par divers conseils et remarques d’auteurs, permet d’expliquer ce consensus, qui peut paraitre dogmatique. Dans les deux langues, la chasse aux adjectifs repondrait a un double souci : epargner au lecteur une surcharge cognitive, et sauvegarder son autonomie d’interpretation.
No abstract is provided for this article.
We examined the profile of two bombesin (BN) antagonists, (CH3)2CHCO-His-Trp-Ala-Val-d-Ala-His-Leu-NHCH3] (ICI 216140) and [d-Phe6,des-Met14]BN(6–14)ethylamide (DPDM-BN EA), against neuromedin B-induced Ca2+ mobilization in the small cell lung cancer (SCLC) line NCI-H345. Neuromedin B (NMB), a BN-like peptide sharing sequence homology with ranatensin, elicited a concentration-dependent Ca2+ release (in part) from intracellular stores. Sequential addition of NMB attenuated Ca2+ mobilization. Desensitization occurred between BN and NMB; depletion of intracellular Ca2+ is a likely mechanism because thapsigargin stimulated Ca2+ release after a maximally desensitizing dose of NMB. ICI 216140 and DPDM-BN EA competitively inhibited BN-induced Ca2+ transients. In contrast, these compounds antagonized NMB-stimulated Ca2+ transients in a noncompetitive manner. The pharmacological profiles obtained support receptor heterogeneity for BN-like peptides on this SCLC line, underscoring the need for thorough examination of dose-response relationships when investigating effects of BN analogues on intact cells.
Two studies examine the relations of self-complexity (Linville, 1987) and the authenticity of to well being. Study 1 results show that self-complexity is largely unrelated to well being, whereas the authenticity of the that constitute it is associated with greater well being. Study 2 uses a two-week, prospective design to replicate Linville's finding of a buffering effect of complexity on the negative outcomes associated with stressful events. In addition, study 2 results revealed either null or negative relations of complexity to well being, whereas the authenticity of was again positively related to well being. The findings are discussed with respect to the meaning of self-complexity for personality functioning, and the importance of having one's be authentic. According to many theorists, the diversity of roles, demands and models of identity to which people are exposed within modern cultures has fostered a greater complexity to human personalities (Baumeister & Muraven, 1996; Ryan & Deci, 2003). People adapt to such diverse demands and roles by adopting different styles, modes of behavior and faces that they can employ within different life contexts (Gergen, 1991). How this increased differentiation or complexity impacts upon health and well being remains, however, a matter of debate. A popular paradigm for investigating personality complexity and its relations with well being was developed by Linville (1985, 1987). Her procedure assesses the extent to which people report multiple aspects to their personality, and it is the number and independence of these self-aspects that comprise what she calls self-complexity. Linville specifically highlights a potential adaptive advantage of greater self-complexity--namely that it can serve as a buffer to stress. With greater self-complexity (i.e., more, and less interrelated, self-aspects) a person's eggs are not all in one basket, and thus a blow to any one self-aspect should have less negative impact on well being. At the same time, the idea that less inter-related elements would conduce to greater well being seems to contradict traditional clinical wisdom (Ryan, 1993) as well as some recent empirical evidence. Donohue, Robins, Roberts and John (1993), for example, argued that insofar as differentiation or complexity refers to the existence of dissimilar and/or functionally independent parts to one's personality, it may represent a fragmented self. They showed that the tendency to see one's self as different in different roles predicted poorer general adjustment. Linville (1987) too, despite the salience of her buffering hypothesis, suggested that complexity may be associated with chronic, low-level stress, perhaps because of role conflicts or multiple demands on time and attention (p. 672). A meta-analysis by Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg (2002) also suggests that the benefits of self-complexity remain unclear. Their analysis of 70 studies relating Linville's self-complexity measure to well being suggested that: a) when considered as an individual difference, self-complexity is modestly and negatively related to well being; and b) the hypothesis that complexity buffers one against stress has received, at best, mixed support. The present research revisits the relations of self-complexity to well being by investigating a hypothesis derived from Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2004). We argue that it is not complexity per se that hinders well being, but rather the presence within one's self-concept of aspects that are poorly integrated, and thus represent inauthentic ways of being. Accordingly, we examine the effects of both self-complexity and the authenticity of the that constitute it on stress and well being over time. Before turning to specific predictions we first review work on self-complexity and SDT, respectively. …
After I graduated from high school, in 1960, I was a student for four years at Hamilton College. Mathematics was my major, but I became increasingly interested in psychology during that period. Many years before I was at Hamilton, B. F. Skinner had been a student there, and by the time I got there the psychology faculty’s research was based entirely on Skinner’s operant theory, which was focused primarily on rewards, although they were called reinforcements. Similarly, the psychology program for students was entirely operant-theory-based.
No abstract is provided for this article.
Brazilian and Canadian students reported on the importance and frequency of cultural practices and values reflecting Triandis’s cultural model of individualistic-collectivistic and horizontal-vertical orientations. They also rated their relative autonomy for these practices and the degree to which parents and teachers supported self-determination theory’s psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. It was predicted that in both samples, despite the mean differences, greater relative autonomy and need support would be associated with greater well-being and cultural identity. It was also expected that vertical cultural orientations would be less well internalized in both Brazilian and Canadian groups. Means and covariance structure analyses verified measurement comparability. Results generally supported the hypotheses. Discussion focuses on the importance of internalization across cultural forms, the differentiation of autonomy from individualism and independence, and the relations between horizontal cultural orientations and psychological needs support.
If a person who is intrinsically motivated to perform an activity begins to receive external reinforcement for the activity, what will happen to his intrinsic motivation? Previous studies and the present study indicate that money decreases intrinsic motivation, while verbal reinforcements tend to enhance intrinsic motivation. The beginning of a cognitive evaluation theory is discussed, and an apparently discrepant prediction between this theory and inequity theory is pointed out. It is argued, however, that the theories are not conceptually discrepant, and the present study gives support for this argument. It is possible to distinguish between two broad classes of motivation to perform an activity: intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. A person is intrinsically motivated if he performs an activity for no apparent reward except the activity itself (cf. Berlyne, 1966; Hunt, 1965; White, 1959). Extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, refers to the performance of an activity because it leads to external rewards (e.g., status, approval, or passing grades). The question of interest in this study is whether there will be changes in a person's intrinsic motivation for an activity when he receives external rewards for performing that activity. Deci (1971) reported that external reinforcements do affect intrinsic motivation, and he suggested the initial elements of a cognitive evaluation theory to account for the changes in intrinsic motivation following an experience with extrinsic rewards. The theory focuses on a person's cognitive evaluation of an activity and the reasons for his engaging in the activity. It suggests that distinctions should be made among different kinds of external rewards, since a person's evaluation of different rewards may be different. In turn, this would 1 The author would like to thank Wayne Cascio for serving as the first experimenter and for helping with the data analysis; Victor Vroom for making helpful comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript; and Larry Coff for being the second experimenter.
