Model-based planning and prospection are widely studied in both cognitive neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI), but from different perspectives - and with different desiderata in mind (biological realism versus scalability) that are difficult to reconcile. Here, we introduce a novel method to plan in large POMDPs - Active Tree Search - that combines the normative character and biological realism of a leading planning theory in neuroscience (Active Inference) and the scalability of Monte-Carlo methods in AI. This unification is beneficial for both approaches. On the one hand, using Monte-Carlo planning permits scaling up the biologically grounded approach of Active Inference to large-scale problems. On the other hand, the theory of Active Inference provides a principled solution to the balance of exploration and exploitation, which is often addressed heuristically in Monte-Carlo methods. Our simulations show that Active Tree Search successfully navigates binary trees that are challenging for sampling-based methods, problems that require adaptive exploration, and the large POMDP problem Rocksample. Furthermore, we illustrate how Active Tree Search can be used to simulate neurophysiological responses (e.g., in the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex) of humans and other animals that contain large planning problems. These simulations show that Active Tree Search is a principled realisation of neuroscientific and AI theories of planning, which offers both biological realism and scalability.
In this paper, complex dynamical synchronization in a non-linear model of a neural system is studied, and the computational significance of the behaviours is explored. The local neural dynamics is determined by voltage- and ligand-gated ion channels and feedback between densely interconnected excitatory and inhibitory neurons. A mesoscopic array of local networks is modelled by introducing coupling between the local networks via weak excitatory-to-excitatory connectivity. It is shown that with modulation of this long-range synaptic coupling, the system undergoes a transition from independent oscillations to stable chaotic synchronization. Between these states exists a 'weakly' stable state associated with complex, intermittent behaviour in the temporal domain and clusters of synchronous regions in the spatial domain. The paper concludes with a discussion of the putative relevance of such processes in the brain, including the role of neuromodulatory systems and the mechanisms underlying sensory perception, adaptation, computation and complexity.
Attractor dynamics are a hallmark of many complex systems, including the brain. Understanding how such self-organizing dynamics emerge from first principles is crucial for advancing our understanding of neuronal computations and the design of artificial intelligence systems. Here we formalize how attractor networks emerge from the free energy principle applied to a universal partitioning of random dynamical systems. Our approach obviates the need for explicitly imposed learning and inference rules and identifies emergent, but efficient and biologically plausible inference and learning dynamics for such self-organizing systems. These result in a collective, multi-level Bayesian active inference process. Attractors on the free energy landscape encode prior beliefs; inference integrates sensory data into posterior beliefs; and learning fine-tunes couplings to minimize long-term surprise. Analytically and via simulations, we establish that the proposed networks favor approximately orthogonalized attractor representations, a consequence of simultaneously optimizing predictive accuracy and model complexity. These attractors efficiently span the input subspace, enhancing generalization and the mutual information between hidden causes and observable effects. Furthermore, while random data presentation leads to symmetric and sparse couplings, sequential data fosters asymmetric couplings and non-equilibrium steady-state dynamics, offering a natural extension to conventional Boltzmann Machines. Our findings offer a unifying theory of self-organizing attractor networks, providing novel insights for AI and neuroscience.
This technical report revisits the analysis of family-wise error rates in statistical parametric mapping - using random field theory - reported in (Eklund et al., 2015). Contrary to the understandable spin that these sorts of analyses attract, a review of their results suggests that they endorse the use of parametric assumptions - and random field theory - in the analysis of functional neuroimaging data. We briefly rehearse the advantages parametric analyses offer over nonparametric alternatives and then unpack the implications of (Eklund et al., 2015) for parametric procedures.
Newly emerging infectious diseases, such as the coronavirus (COVID-19), create new challenges for public healthcare systems. Before effective treatments, countering the spread of these infections depends on mitigating, protective behaviours such as social distancing, respecting lockdown, wearing masks, frequent handwashing, travel restrictions, and vaccine acceptance. Previous work has shown that the enacting protective behaviours depends on beliefs about individual vulnerability, threat severity, and one's ability to engage in such protective actions. However, little is known about the genesis of these beliefs in response to an infectious disease epidemic, and the cognitive mechanisms that may link these beliefs to decision making. Active inference (AI) is a recent approach to behavioural modelling that integrates embodied perception, action, belief updating, and decision making. This approach provides a framework to understand the behaviour of agents in situations that require planning under uncertainty. It assumes that the brain infers the hidden states that cause sensations, predicts the perceptual feedback produced by adaptive actions, and chooses actions that minimize expected surprise in the future. In this paper, we present a computational account describing how individuals update their beliefs about the risks and thereby commit to protective behaviours. We show how perceived risks, beliefs about future states, sensory uncertainty, and outcomes under each policy can determine individual protective behaviours. We suggest that these mechanisms are crucial to assess how individuals cope with uncertainty during a pandemic, and we show the interest of these new perspectives for public health policies.
Abstract We describe an extension of our empirical Bayes approach to magnetoencephalography/electroencephalography (MEG/EEG) source reconstruction that covers both evoked and induced responses. The estimation scheme is based on classical covariance component estimation using restricted maximum likelihood (ReML). We have focused previously on the estimation of spatial covariance components under simple assumptions about the temporal correlations. Here we extend the scheme, using temporal basis functions to place constraints on the temporal form of the responses. We show how the same scheme can estimate evoked responses that are phase‐locked to the stimulus and induced responses that are not. For a single trial the model is exactly the same. In the context of multiple trials, however, the inherent distinction between evoked and induced responses calls for different treatments of the underlying hierarchical multitrial model. We derive the respective models and show how they can be estimated efficiently using ReML. This enables the Bayesian estimation of evoked and induced changes in power or, more generally, the energy of wavelet coefficients. Hum Brain Mapp, 2006. © 2006 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
The psychological concepts of working memory and attention are widely used in the cognitive and neuroscientific literatures. Perhaps because of the interdisciplinary appeal of these concepts, the same terms are often used to mean very different things. Drawing on recent advances in theoretical neurobiology, this paper tries to highlight the correspondence between these established psychological constructs and the formal processes implicit in mathematical descriptions of brain function. Here, we consider attention and salience from the perspective offered by active inference. Using variational principles and simulations, we use active inference to demonstrate how attention and salience can be disambiguated in terms of message passing between populations of neurons in cortical and subcortical structures. In brief, we suggest that salience is something that is afforded to actions that realise epistemic affordance, while attention per se is afforded to precise sensory evidence - or beliefs about the causes of sensations.
No abstract is provided for this article.
