1,987 publications from this institution
Front cover: The cover image, by Bao-Juan Li et al., is based on the Review Article A brain network model for depression: From symptom understanding to disease intervention. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/cns.12998. Front cover: The cover image, by Bao-Juan Li et al., is based on the Review Article A brain network model for depression: From symptom understanding to disease intervention. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/cns.12998.
There is a growing appreciation of the importance of nonlinearities in evoked responses in fMRI, particularly with the advent of event-related fMRI. These nonlinearities are commonly expressed as interactions among stimuli that can lead to the suppression and increased latency of responses to a stimulus that are incurred by a preceding stimulus. We have presented previously a model-free characterization of these effects using generic techniques from nonlinear system identification, namely a Volterra series formulation. At the same time Buxton et al. (1998) described a plausible and compelling dynamical model of hemodynamic signal transduction in fMRI. Subsequent work by Mandeville et al. (1999) provided important theoretical and empirical constraints on the form of the dynamic relationship between blood flow and volume that underpins the evolution of the fMRI signal. In this paper we combine these system identification and model-based approaches and ask whether the Balloon model is sufficient to account for the nonlinear behaviors observed in real time series. We conclude that it can, and furthermore the model parameters that ensue are biologically plausible. This conclusion is based on the observation that the Balloon model can produce Volterra kernels that emulate empirical kernels. To enable this evaluation we had to embed the Balloon model in a hemodynamic input-state-output model that included the dynamics of perfusion changes that are contingent on underlying synaptic activation. This paper presents (i) the full hemodynamic model (ii), how its associated Volterra kernels can be derived, and (iii) addresses the model's validity in relation to empirical nonlinear characterisations of evoked responses in fMRI and other neurophysiological constraints.
To act upon the world, creatures must change continuous variables such as muscle length or chemical concentration. In contrast, decision making is an inherently discrete process, involving the selection among alternative courses of action. In this article, we consider the interface between the discrete and continuous processes that translate our decisions into movement in a Newtonian world—and how movement informs our decisions. We do so by appealing to active inference, with a special focus on the oculomotor system. Within this exemplar system, we argue that the superior colliculus is well placed to act as a discrete-continuous interface. Interestingly, when the neuronal computations within the superior colliculus are formulated in terms of active inference, we find that many aspects of its neuroanatomy emerge from the computations it must perform in this role.
We recently described a dynamic causal model of a COVID-19 outbreak within a single region. Here, we combine several instantiations of this (epidemic) model to create a (pandemic) model of viral spread among regions. Our focus is on a second wave of new cases that may result from loss of immunity—and the exchange of people between regions—and how mortality rates can be ameliorated under different strategic responses. In particular, we consider hard or soft social distancing strategies predicated on national (Federal) or regional (State) estimates of the prevalence of infection in the population. The modelling is demonstrated using timeseries of new cases and deaths from the United States to estimate the parameters of a factorial (compartmental) epidemiological model of each State and, crucially, coupling between States. Using Bayesian model reduction, we identify the effective connectivity between States that best explains the initial phases of the outbreak in the United States. Using the ensuing posterior parameter estimates, we then evaluate the likely outcomes of different policies in terms of mortality, working days lost due to lockdown and demands upon critical care. The provisional results of this modelling suggest that social distancing and loss of immunity are the two key factors that underwrite a return to endemic equilibrium.
Abstract The neurobiological understanding of mood, and by extension mood disorders, remains elusive despite decades of research implicating several neuromodulator systems. This review considers a new approach based on existing theories of functional brain organisation. The free energy principle (a.k.a. active inference), and its instantiation in the Bayesian brain, offers a complete and simple formulation of mood. It has been proposed that emotions reflect the precision of – or certainty about – the predicted sensorimotor/interoceptive consequences of action. By extending this reasoning, in a hierarchical setting, we suggest mood states act as (hyper) priors over uncertainty (i.e. emotions). Here, we consider the same computational pathology in the proprioceptive and interoceptive (behavioural and autonomic) domain in order to furnish an explanation for mood disorders. This formulation reconciles several strands of research at multiple levels of enquiry.
We present a simple way of assessing dynamic or time-dependent changes in displacement during single-subject radioligand positron emission tomography (PET) activation studies. The approach is designed to facilitate dynamic activation studies using selective radioligands. These studies are, in principle, capable of characterising functional neurochemistry by analogy with the study of functional neuroanatomy using rCBF activation studies. The proposed approach combines time-dependent compartmental models of tracer kinetics and the general linear model used in statistical parametric mapping. This provides for a comprehensive, voxel-based and data-led assessment of regionally specific effects. The statistical model proposed in this paper is predicated on a single-compartment model extended to allow for time-dependent changes in kinetics. We have addressed the sensitivity and specificity of the analysis, as it would be used operationally, by applying the analysis to 11 C-Flumazenil dynamic displacement studies. The activation used in this demonstration study was a pharmacological (i.v. midazolam) challenge, 30 min after administration of the tracer. We were able to demonstrate, and make statistical inferences about, regional increases in k 2 (or decreases in the volume of distribution) in prefrontal and other cortical areas.
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance—in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations—is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account—an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
