1,987 publications from this institution
Active inference is a Bayesian framework for understanding biological intelligence. The underlying theory brings together perception and action under one single imperative: minimizing free energy. However, despite its theoretical utility in explaining intelligence, computational implementations have been restricted to low-dimensional and idealized situations. In this paper, we present a neural architecture for building deep active inference agents operating in complex, continuous state-spaces using multiple forms of Monte-Carlo (MC) sampling. For this, we introduce a number of techniques, novel to active inference. These include: i) selecting free-energy-optimal policies via MC tree search, ii) approximating this optimal policy distribution via a feed-forward `habitual' network, iii) predicting future parameter belief updates using MC dropouts and, finally, iv) optimizing state transition precision (a high-end form of attention). Our approach enables agents to learn environmental dynamics efficiently, while maintaining task performance, in relation to reward-based counterparts. We illustrate this in a new toy environment, based on the dSprites data-set, and demonstrate that active inference agents automatically create disentangled representations that are apt for modeling state transitions. In a more complex Animal-AI environment, our agents (using the same neural architecture) are able to simulate future state transitions and actions (i.e., plan), to evince reward-directed navigation - despite temporary suspension of visual input. These results show that deep active inference - equipped with MC methods - provides a flexible framework to develop biologically-inspired intelligent agents, with applications in both machine learning and cognitive science.
This paper contrasts different experimental designs for revealing the neural correlates of phonological retrieval (i.e., naming). Cognitive subtraction designs require a minimum of one task pair and the comparison between tasks reveals the differing functional task components. Conjunction analysis requires a minimum of two task pairs, each differing by the same component, and this component is revealed as the difference which is common to both task pairs. Two different limitations of cognitive subtraction are highlighted: 1) the difficulty of finding baseline tasks that activate all but the process of interest, and 2) activation differences (between the two tasks of a pair) include the interaction term, i.e., the effect that the added component in the activation task has on preexisting components. The problem of baseline selection can be overcome by conjunction analysis, for which there may be many processing differences for each task pair, providing that the only common difference between pairs is the component of interest. The problem of interactions can be overcome when the experimental design is factorial. This permits the effect that an added component has on the expression of preexisting components (i.e., the interaction term) to be evaluated explicitly. We demonstrate that when the design is factorial, conjunction analysis reveals commonalities in activation, while the interactions reveal task-specific effects.
The successive expression of neuronal transients is related to dynamic correlations and, as shown in this paper, to dynamic instability. Dynamic instability is a form of complexity, typical of neuronal systems, which may be crucial for adaptive brain function from two perspectives. The first is from the point of view of neuronal selection and self–organizing systems: if selective mechanisms underpin the emergence of adaptive neuronal responses then dynamic instability is, itself, necessarily adaptive. This is because dynamic instability is the source of diversity on which selection acts and is therefore subject to selective pressure. In short, the emergence of order, through selection, depends almost paradoxically on the instabilities that characterize the diversity of brain dynamics. The second perspective is provided by information theory.
This paper offers a formal account of emotional inference and stress-related behaviour, using the notion of active inference. We formulate responses to stressful scenarios in terms of Bayesian belief-updating and subsequent policy selection; namely, planning as (active) inference. Using a minimal model of how creatures or subjects account for their sensations (and subsequent action), we deconstruct the sequences of belief updating and behaviour that underwrite stress-related responses - and simulate the aberrant responses of the sort seen in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Crucially, the model used for belief-updating generates predictions in multiple (exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive) modalities, to provide an integrated account of evidence accumulation and multimodal integration that has consequences for both motor and autonomic responses. The ensuing phenomenology speaks to many constructs in the ecological and clinical literature on stress, which we unpack with reference to simulated inference processes and accompanying neuronal responses. A key insight afforded by this formal approach rests on the trade-off between the epistemic affordance of certain cues (that resolve uncertainty about states of affairs in the environment) and the consequences of epistemic foraging (that may be in conflict with the instrumental or pragmatic value of 'fleeing' or 'freezing'). Starting from first principles, we show how this trade-off is nuanced by prior (subpersonal) beliefs about the outcomes of behaviour - beliefs that, when held with unduly high precision, can lead to (Bayes optimal) responses that closely resemble PTSD.
This paper presents a theoretical review of rapid eye movement sleep with a special focus on pontine-geniculate-occipital waves and what they might tell us about the functional anatomy of sleep and consciousness. In particular, we review established ideas about the nature and purpose of sleep in terms of protoconsciousness and free energy minimization. By combining these theoretical perspectives, we discover answers to some fundamental questions about sleep: for example, why is homeothermy suspended during sleep? Why is sleep necessary? Why are we not surprised by our dreams? What is the role of synaptic regression in sleep? The imperatives for sleep that emerge also allow us to speculate about the functional role of PGO waves and make some empirical predictions that can, in principle, be tested using recent advances in the modeling of electrophysiological data.