Publications

Who was colonized and when? A cross-country analysis of determinants

Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem

Intertemporal and cross-sectional contrasts in effects of trade: Significance of the technology content of exports

This study identifies cross-country and intertemporal differences in the effects of trade exposure on per capita national income. We develop a small open economy endogenous growth model with high- and low-technology sectors and endogenous human capital accumulation. We then test the predictions of our model on a sample of 70 countries over the period 1980–2017. Our main assertion is that gains from trade are not only disproportionate across countries but also contrasting over time, depending on the technology intensity of exports. Countries with lower initial experience in the production of technology-intensive goods and services tend to specialize in sectors with lower demand for better-educated and high-skilled workforce, which lowers the return to and individual incentives for education. Consequently, trade-induced specialization patterns, due to their implications about technological progress, appear to be an important factor causing cross-national divergence in welfare. Our theoretical model implies that, in an unskilled labor-abundant country, higher exposure to international trade can decrease the long-run growth rate, even though it increases short-run per capita income. In a skilled-labor abundant country, both short-run and long-run effects are positive. Our empirical findings, which identify short-run and long-run effects separately, strongly support these predictions.

Can endogenously chosen institutions mitigate the free-rider problem and reduce perverse punishment?

Previous experiments on public goods dilemmas have found that the opportunity to punish leads to higher contributions and reduces the free rider problem; however, a substantial amount of punishment is targeted on high contributors. In the experiment reported here, subjects are given the opportunity to vote on rules governing punishment. We found that, from their first opportunity to vote, no group ever allowed punishment of high contributors, most groups eventually voted to allow punishment of low contributors, and a minority of groups never allowed any form of punishment. Groups allowing punishment of low but not high contributors had significantly higher efficiency and contributions than comparison groups with unrestricted punishment.

Determinants and Economic Consequences of Colonization: A Global Analysis

Research on economic growth suggests that the era of colonization has had an impact on the levels of economic development of countries around the globe. However, why some countries were colonized early, some late, and others not at all, and what effect these differences have had on current income, has not been studied systematically. In the first part of this paper, we show that both the occurrence and the timing of colonization can be explained by (a) differences in levels of pre-1500 development, (b) proximity to the colonizing powers, (c) disease environment, and (d) latitude. In the second part, we analyze the developmental consequences of colonization while taking the endogeneity of colonization's occurrence and timing into account. Whereas naïve estimates can suggest large impacts, we find that neither the fact nor the timing of colonization affect income today once colonization's impact on the composition of the population and the quality of institutions is controlled for.

When to Not Respond in Kind? Individuals’ Expectations of the Future and Their Support for Reciprocity in Foreign Policy

Democratization, state capacity and developmental correlates of international artificial intelligence trade

Does acquiring artificial intelligence (AI) technologies from the US or China render countries more authoritarian or technologically less advantageous? In this article, we explore to what extent importing AI/high-tech from the US and/or China goes parallel with importers' (a) democratization or autocratization, (b) state capacity, and (c) technological progress across a decade (2010–2020). Our work demonstrates that not only are Chinese AI/high-tech exports not congruous with importers' democratic backsliding, but autocratization attributed to Chinese AI is also visible in importers of US AI. In addition, for most indicators, we do not observe any significant effect of acquiring AI from the US or China on importers' state capacity or technological progress across the same period. Instead, we find that the story has a global inequality dimension as Chinese exports are clustered around countries with a lower GDP per capita, whereas US high-technology exports are clustered around relatively wealthier states with slightly weaker capacity over territorial control. Overall, the article empirically demonstrates the limitations of some of the prevalent policy discourses surrounding the global diffusion of AI and its contribution to democratization, state capacity, and technological development of importer nations.

The Strategic Logic of Digital Disinformation Offense, Defence and Deterrence in Information Warfare

Why do countries engage in disinformation campaigns even though they know that they will likely be debunked later on? We explore a core puzzle in information warfare whereby countries that pursue disinformation to confuse and demobilize their adversaries usually suffer from reputational penalties after they are debunked, yet they nonetheless continue to pursue such tactics. In order to explain this dilemma, we employ a formal model and walk through anarchy, pre-emption, and cost miscalculation explanations of disinformation and demonstrate that countries may rationally engage in disinformation campaigns if they have a different calculus about reputational costs, if they believe their adversaries will not be able to debunk their claims successfully, and if those adversaries will not be able to disseminate their debunked claims well enough to incur reputational costs on the initiator. Ultimately, we suggest that deterrence in information warfare is attainable if the ‘defender’ can signal its debunking and ‘naming-shaming’ capacity prior to the disinformation campaign and if it can mobilize the support of the international audience against the attacker. We conclude by arguing that a country’s fact-checking ecosystem and its pre-existing perception within the mainstream international digital media environment are the strongest defenses against disinformation.

KÜRESEL FİNANSAL KRİZİN ÖZEL VE KAMU SERMAYELİ BANKA DAVRANIŞLARINA ETKİSİ: KAPSAMLI BİR YAZIN TARAMASI VE TÜRKİYE BANKACILIK SEKTÖRÜ ÖRNEĞİ

Bu çalışmanın amacı bankaların kredi verme, likidite ve risk alma ile ilgili davranışlarına etki eden unsurlarla ilgili literatür bulgularını ortaya koymak ve Türkiye bankacılık sektörünün 2005-2018 dönemi verileri ışığında, kamu ve özel sermayeli bankaların bu üç alandaki davranışlarında 2007- 2008 döneminde yaşanan Küresel Finansal Kriz sonrasında gözlemlenen değişiklikleri incelemektir. Kuruluş amaçları dikkate alındığında, ekonomik aktivitenin yavaşladığı ve özellikle finansal sistemin krizde olduğu dönemlerde, kamu bankalarının özel bankalara kıyasla, likidite pozisyonlarını göreceli olarak azaltmak suretiyle, daha fazla kredi vermeye çalışmaları ve risk almaları beklenir. İlgili akademik çalışmalar göstermektedir ki finansal krizler sonrası oluşan ekonomik şartlara kamu bankaları, özel bankalara kıyasla farklı tepkiler göstermektedirler. Türkiye bankacılık sektörünün 2005-2018 dönemi verileri incelendiğinde, literatürdeki bulgulara paralel olarak, Türkiye’deki kamu ve özel bankalar arasında davranış farklılıkları olduğu ve bu farklılıkların yapısında kriz sonrası dönemde önemli değişiklikler yaşandığı bulunmuştur.

Global financial environment or monetary transmission mechanism? The (special) dynamics of Turkey's external deficit after 2002

Abstract This study develops a simple theoretical framework and conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis on (a) the role of monetary policy on external funding and loan growth, (b) the consequent growth in national spending and finally, (c) the effects of these on the external deficit of Turkey within the period of 2002 to 2016. We argue that this was a highly unusual period with abundant global liquidity, substantial decrease in domestic real interest rates, considerable growth in capital inflow and bank lending, but a remarkable deterioration in external balance. Our empirical approach sheds light on both short and long run dynamics among key domestic and global economic indicators, those related to monetary policy, capital inflows, domestic spending, exchange rates and external deficit. Overall, while clearly validating the import dependency of the Turkish economy, our findings provide mixed evidence about the role of monetary policy on external deficit. Among the monetary policy tools tested, only the reserve requirement policy, seems to have a direct effect, however, real interest rates seem to be influential only via the channel of consumer loans and consumption expenditures. Expansions in bank lending cause corresponding increases in components of national expenditure, which subsequently contribute to the deterioration in trade deficit. As for the policy implications of our findings, to reduce external deficit, in long run, lowering the import dependency of the economy and reducing the shortfall in national savings is vital, whereas, in short run, only distortionary policies, such as limiting loan growth or restricting imports, are only feasible options.

Politics of Artificial Intelligence Adoption: Unpacking the Regime Type Debate

Analist Önerilerinin Finansal Değeri: Risk Faktörlerinin Ötesinde Ne Söylüyorlar?

Finansal analistler, yazdıkları raporlarla pay piyasasında sağlıklı bilgi akışına katkıda bulundukları gibi, önerileriyle de büyük bir yatırım sektörünün portföy kararlarını etkileme gücüne sahipler. Bu çalışma, Borsa İstanbul (BİST) hisse senetleri için yapılan analist önerileri doğrultusunda oluşturulan portföylerin getirilerini risk faktörleriyle açıklamayı ve analist önerilerinin ek getiri sağlamadaki başarısını ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda analist önerileri dikkate alınarak oluşturulan eşit ve değer ağırlıklı portföyler; CAPM, Fama-French ve Carhart varlık fiyatlama modelleri ile test edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, analist önerilerinin ekonomik durgunluk dönemlerinde bir değer yaratıp yaratmadığı incelenmiştir. Her ne kadar analistlerin olumlu önerileri göreceli yüksek getiri getirse de bu getiriler bilinen risk faktörleri ile açıklandığında ekonomik ve istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir ek getiriden bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Elde ettiğimiz bulgular ışığında, BİST için örneklem dönemimizde, analistlerin önerileri ile oluşturulan portföylerin piyasa getirisine kıyasla ve risk faktörlerinin verdiği bilgilerin ötesinde bir ek getiri üretemediği sonucuna ulaşmaktayız.

Foreign Direct Investment in North Africa

North Africa is considered to be one of the wealthiest areas of the continent thanks to its natural resources and strategic geopolitical location. While the region is generating about one-third of Africa's total GDP, its economic indicators are not presenting a bright picture for North African countries. This chapter attempts to provide an in-depth overview of the investment environment and shed light on the main constraints on foreign direct investment (FDI) in each of the North African countries. The authors focus on contemporary trends in FDI and policies regarding human capital promotion and infrastructure development. The descriptive analysis indicates that the volume of FDI in the North Africa region is still weak compared to international flows to other developing regions. This outcome can be associated, in addition to unattractive FDI policies, with the absence of real economic and financial reforms, persistent political instability, lack of technological readiness, inadequate regulatory and institutional framework, high corruption and inefficient bureaucracy.

The Strategic Logic of Digital Disinformation

Why do countries engage in disinformation campaigns even though they know that they will likely be debunked later on? We explore a core puzzle in information warfare in which countries that pursue disinformation to confuse and demobilise their adversaries usually suffer from reputational penalties after they are debunked, yet they nonetheless continue to pursue such tactics. In order to explain this dilemma, we employ a formal model and walk through anarchy, pre-emption and cost miscalculation explanations of disinformation and demonstrate that countries may rationally engage in disinformation campaigns if they have a different calculus about reputational costs, if they believe their adversaries will not be able to debunk their claims successfully, and if those adversaries will not be able to disseminate their debunked claims well enough to incur reputational costs on the initiator. Ultimately, we suggest that deterrence in information warfare is attainable if the “defender” can signal its debunking and “naming-shaming” capacity prior to the disinformation campaign and if it can mobilise the support of the international audience against the attacker. We conclude by arguing that a country’s fact-checking ecosystem and its pre-existing perception within the mainstream international digital media environment are the strongest defences against disinformation.

Politics of Artificial Intelligence Adoption: Unpacking the Regime Type Debate

What determines whether a country imports high-technology artificial intelligence (A.I.) products from the United States and China? Over the last decade, a growing body of literature began focusing on regime types and argue that authoritarian countries tend to import A.I. from China, whereas democratic countries from the United States. In this study, we test this regime-type hypothesis and find that both the US and China export to authoritarian and democratic countries alike, with China exporting to a larger number of countries. By employing multinomial logit with three leading A.I. trade datasets from Stanford University, Carnegie Endowment and World Bank, we find that Chinese A.I. exports are not driven by regime type, whereas American exports are. US A.I. exports are geared towards a smaller market of wealthy nations, whereas China supplies to a broader market that is made up of a variety of regime types and GDP levels. Furthermore, we find that more countries import surveillance and policing-related A.I. products from the United States, compared to China, debunking a common mainstream view. We conclude by arguing military spending and GDP per capita are two of the strongest determinants of US A.I. exports, while a robust export pattern doesn’t emerge with Chinese A.I.

Politics of Artificial Intelligence Adoption

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KÜRESEL FİNANSAL KRİZİN ÖZEL VE KAMU SERMAYELİ BANKA DAVRANIŞLARINA ETKİSİ: KAPSAMLI BİR YAZIN TARAMASI VE TÜRKİYE BANKACILIK SEKTÖRÜ ÖRNEĞİ

Bu çalışmanın amacı bankaların kredi verme, likidite ve risk alma ile ilgili davranışlarına etki eden unsurlarla ilgili literatür bulgularını ortaya koymak ve Türkiye bankacılık sektörünün 2005-2018 dönemi verileri ışığında, kamu ve özel sermayeli bankaların bu üç alandaki davranışlarında 2007- 2008 döneminde yaşanan Küresel Finansal Kriz sonrasında gözlemlenen değişiklikleri incelemektir. Kuruluş amaçları dikkate alındığında, ekonomik aktivitenin yavaşladığı ve özellikle finansal sisteminkrizde olduğu dönemlerde, kamu bankalarının özel bankalara kıyasla, likidite pozisyonlarını göreceli olarak azaltmak suretiyle, daha fazla kredi vermeye çalışmaları ve risk almaları beklenir. İlgili akademik çalışmalar göstermektedir ki finansal krizler sonrası oluşan ekonomik şartlara kamu bankaları, özel bankalara kıyasla farklı tepkiler göstermektedirler. Türkiye bankacılık sektörünün 2005-2018 dönemi verileri incelendiğinde, literatürdeki bulgulara paralel olarak, Türkiye’deki kamu ve özel bankalararasında davranış farklılıkları olduğu ve bu farklılıkların yapısında kriz sonrası dönemde önemli değişiklikler yaşandığı bulunmuştur.

Democratization, state capacity and developmental correlates of international artificial intelligence trade

Does acquiring artificial intelligence (A.I.) technologies from the U.S. or China render countries more authoritarian or technologically less advantageous? In this article, we explore to what extent importing A.I./high-tech from the U.S. and/or China goes parallel with importers’ a) democratization or autocratization, b) state capacity, and c) technological progress across a decade (2010–2020). Our work demonstrates that not only are Chinese A.I./high-tech exports not congruous with importers’ democratic backsliding, but autocratization attributed to Chinese A.I. is also visible in importers of U.S. [AH1] A.I. In addition, for most indicators, we do not observe any significant effect of acquiring A.I. from the U.S. or China on importers’ state capacity or technological progress across the same period. Instead, we find that the story has a global inequality dimension as Chinese exports are clustered around countries with a lower GDP per capita, whereas U.S. high-technology exports are clustered around relatively wealthier states with slightly weaker capacity over territorial control. Overall, the article empirically demonstrates the limitations of some of the prevalent policy discourses surrounding the global diffusion of A.I. and its contribution to democratization, state capacity, and technological development of importer nations.