Axiomatic theories of choice introduce preference as a primitive relation, which is interpreted through specific empirical procedures such as choice or pricing. Models of rational choice assume a principle of procedure invariance, which requires strategically equivalent methods of elicitation to yield the same preference order. Thus, if the decision maker prefers A to B, then the cash equivalent, or minimum selling price, of A should exceed that of B. However, there is a substantial body of evidence showing that the price ordering of risky prospects is systematically different from the choice ordering, contrary to standard theories of choice.
Sarah Lichtenstein, Sarah Lichtenstein, Cass R. Sunstein, Sarah Lichtenstein, Sarah Lichtenstein, Sarah Lichtenstein, Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, Sarah Lichtenstein, David M. Grether, Sarah Lichtenstein, Amos Tversky, David Schkade, Amos Tversky, Christopher K. Hsee, Stephen M. Nowlis, Jerome R. Busemeyer, Sarah Lichtenstein, Dan Simon, Dan Ariely, Dan Ariely, Naomi Mandel, Sheena S. Iyengar, Sarah Lichtenstein, James R. Bettman, Hugh Montgomery, Ola Svenson, Daniel Read
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