Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations

Valerio Scarani; Antonio Acín; G. Ribordy; Nicolas Gisin

doi:10.1103/physrevlett.92.057901

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Quantum Cryptography Protocols Robust against Photon Number Splitting Attacks for Weak Laser Pulse Implementations

Physical Review Letters 92(5)

Article 2004 English

Abstract

1 min read

We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error.

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