730 publications from this institution
Thirty subsystems constituting a functioning motor vehicle, including brake, steering, suspension, engine, electrical, and fuel systems, were evaluated by individuals on a set of risk characteristic scales. These included overall vehicle riskiness, likelihood of severe consequences in the event of system failure, controllability of the vehicle, and observability of impending failure. An analysis of the resulting judgments revealed two composite factors, one representing the controllability of consequences and the other representing observability. Both factors were highly related to judgments of risk, desire for risk regulation, and anticipated recall compliance. A comparison of risk judgments with accident data suggested that for some vehicle systems, particularly those serving a communication function in the driving task, drivers may underestimate the actual risk they face when system performance has degraded.
No abstract is provided for this article.
Extreme events, by definition, cause much harm to people, property, and the natural world. Sometimes they result from the vagaries of nature, as in the case of flood, earthquake, or storm, and thus are truly the outcomes of games against nature. In other cases they follow technological failure or unintentional human error, as in the case of Chernobyl or Bhopal, putting them also into the category of risks that are predictable only probabilistically. More recently we have witnessed another form of extreme hazard, resulting from terrorism. One of us has termed this a new species of trouble (Slovic, in press), since it involves an intelligent and motivated opponent, putting the situations that give rise to these types of extreme events into the domain of economic game theory. The purpose of this brief review is to examine what existing research can tell us about the perception of risk associated with these extreme events. We will also point out issues that remain in need of exploration.
The identifiable victim effect refers to people's greater willingness to share resources with identified targets (about whom they have some identifying information) than to share with unidentified or statistical targets. Previous research examining adults' behavior suggests that identifiable targets arouse in the perceiver an intense emotional reaction that, in turn, increases sharing especially when the target is perceived as needy. In the current research, we examine whether the spontaneous reaction toward an identifiable, needy target and the increase in sharing with such a target appears in young children's sharing behavior and when in early childhood it develops. The results suggest that adding identifying information about a needy recipient increases sharing only in older children (above the age of 5.5) and in children who have acquired higher levels of theory of mind (independent of age). Mediation–moderation analysis suggests that theory of mind mediates the relation between age and sharing mainly when a specific, needy recipient is presented. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
No abstract is provided for this article.
There is an increased willingness to help identified individuals rather than non-identified, and the effect of identifiability is mainly present when a single individual rather than a group is presented. However, identifiability and singularity effects have thus far not been manipulated orthogonally. The present research uses a joint evaluation approach to examine the relative contribution of identifiability and singularity in moral decision-making reflecting conflicting values between deontology and consequentialism. As in trolley dilemmas subjects could either choose to stay with the default option, i.e., giving a potentially life-saving vaccine to a single child, or to actively choose to deny the single child the vaccine in favor of five other children. Identifiability of the single child and the group of children was varied between-subjects in a 2x2 factorial design. In total 1,232 subjects from Sweden and the United States participated in three separate experiments. Across all treatments, in all three experiments, 32.6% of the subjects chose to stay with the deontological default option instead of actively choosing to maximize benefits. Results show that identifiability does not always have a positive effect on decisions in allocation dilemmas. For single targets, identifiability had a negative or no effect in two out of three experiments, while for the group of targets identifiability had a more stable positive effect on subjects’ willingness to allocate vaccines. When the effect of identifiability was negative, process data showed that this effect was mediated by emotional reactance. Hence, the results show that the influence of identifiability is more complex than it has been previously portrayed in the literature on charitable giving.
Risk communication takes place in a variety of forms, ranging from product warning labels on cigarette packages and saccharin bottles to interactions between officials and members of the public on such highly charged issues as Love Canal, AIDS, and the accident at...
People often choose the option that is better on the most subjectively prominent attribute — the prominence effect. We studied the effect of prominence in health care priority setting and hypothesized that values related to health would trump values related to costs in treatment choices, even when individuals themselves evaluated different treatment options as equally good. We conducted pre-registered experiments with a diverse Swedish sample and a sample of international experts on priority setting in health care (n = 1348). Participants, acting in the role of policy makers, revealed their valuation for different medical treatments in hypothetical scenarios. Participants were systematically inconsistent between preferences expressed through evaluation in a matching task and preferences expressed through choice. In line with our hypothesis, a large proportion of participants (General population: 92%, Experts 84% of all choices) chose treatment options that were better on the health dimension (lower health risk) despite having previously expressed indifference between those options and others that were better on the cost dimension. Thus, we find strong evidence of a prominence effect in health-care priority setting. Our findings provide a psychological explanation for why opportunity costs (i.e., the value of choices not exercised) are neglected in health care priority setting.
Transportation of hazardous materials, and particularly radioactive wastes, on public highways has become an important risk management issue. The unfavorability of public attitudes regarding hazardous and nuclear wastes signals the potential for strong public opposition to programs for transporting these materials. This paper presents the results of a survey conducted to assess public reactions to a long‐term nuclear waste transport program planned to follow a route through a portion of rural Oregon. The survey assessed a number of key risk perception issues, including perceived health and safety risks of nuclear waste transport, relative risks of transport vs. storage at an existing site, trust in state officials, and satisfaction with life in communities along the transport route. The survey identified a number of attitudes and concerns that need to be understood and considered by those in charge of designing and implementing the waste‐transportation program.
An article of faith among students of value, choice, and attitude judgments is that people have reasonably well-defined opinions regarding the desirability of various events. Although these opinions may not be intuitively formulated in numerical (or even verbal) form, careful questioning can elicit judgments representing people's underlying values. From this stance, elicitation procedures are neutral tools, bias-free channels that translate subjective feelings into scientifically usable expressions. They impose no views on respondents beyond focusing attention on those value issues of interest to the investigator.
Human beings have always been intuitive toxicologists, relying on their senses of sight, taste, and smell to detect harmful or unsafe food, water, and air. As we have come to recognize that our senses are not adequate to assess the dangers inherent in exposure to a chemical substance, we have created the sciences of toxicology and risk assessment to perform this function. Yet despite this great effort to overcome the limitations of intuitive toxicology, it has become evident that even our best scientific methods still depend heavily on extrapolations and judgments in order to infer human health risks from animal data. Many observers have acknowledged the inherent subjectivity in the assessment of chemical risks and have indicated a need to examine the subjective or intuitive elements of expert and lay risk judgments. Such an examination was begun by surveying members of the Society of Toxicology and the lay public about basic toxicological concepts, assumptions, and interpretations. The results demonstrated large differences between toxicologists and laypeople, as well as differences among toxicologists working in industry, academia, and government. In addition, toxicologists were found to be sharply divided in their opinions about the ability to predict a chemical's effect on human health on the basis of animal studies. These results place the problems of risk communication in a new light. Although the survey identifies misconceptions that experts should clarify for the public, it also suggests that controversies over chemical risks may be fueled as much by limitations of the science of risk assessment and disagreements among experts as by public misconceptions.
People don't ignore mass killings because they lack compassion. Psychological research suggests it's grim statistics themselves that paralyze us into inaction.
No abstract is provided for this article.
We conducted an experimental public opinion study of the effect of balanced information on nanotechnology risk-benefit perceptions. The study found that subjects did not react in a uniform, much less a uniformly positive manner, but rather polarized along lines consistent with cultural predispositions toward technological risk generally.
