One of the most popular paradigms to use for studying human reasoning involves the Wason card selection task. In this task, the participant is presented with four cards and a conditional rule (e.g., “If there is an A on one side of the card, there is always a 2 on the other side”). Participants are asked which cards should be turned to verify whether or not the rule holds. In this simple task, participants consistently provide answers that are incorrect according to formal logic. To account for these errors, several models have been proposed, one of the most prominent being the information gain model (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). This model is based on the assumption that people independently select cards based on the expected information gain of turning a particular card. In this article, we present two estimation methods to fit the information gain model: a maximum likelihood procedure (programmed in R) and a Bayesian procedure (programmed in WinBUGS). We compare the two procedures and illustrate the flexibility of the Bayesian hierarchical procedure by applying it to data from a meta-analysis of the Wason task (Oaksford & Chater, Psychological Review, 101, 608–631, 1994). We also show that the goodness of fit of the information gain model can be assessed by inspecting the posterior predictives of the model. These Bayesian procedures make it easy to apply the information gain model to empirical data. Supplemental materials may be downloaded along with this article from www.springerlink.com .
In this rejoinder, we respond to comments by Lynn, Rushton, and Templer on our previous paper in which we criticized the use of national IQs in studies of evolutionary theories of race differences in intelligence. We reiterate that because of the Flynn Effect and psychometric issues, national IQs cannot be taken to reflect populations’ levels of g as fixed since the last ice age. We argue that the socio-cultural achievements of peoples of Mesopotamia and Egypt in 3000 B.C. stand in stark contrast to the current low level of national IQ of peoples of Iraq and Egypt and that these ancient achievements appear to contradict evolutionary accounts of differences in national IQ. We argue that race differences in brain size, even if these were entirely of genetic origin, leave unexplained 91–95% of the black-white IQ gap. We highlight additional problems with hypotheses raised by Rushton and Templer. National IQs cannot be viewed solely in evolutionary terms but should be considered in light of global differences in socio-economic development, the causes of which are unknown.
All life requires the capacity to recover from challenges that are as inevitable as they are unpredictable. Understanding this resilience is essential for managing the health of humans and their livestock. It has long been difficult to quantify resilience directly, forcing practitioners to rely on indirect static indicators of health. However, measurements from wearable electronics and other sources now allow us to analyze the dynamics of physiology and behavior with unsurpassed resolution. The resulting flood of data coincides with the emergence of novel analytical tools for estimating resilience from the pattern of microrecoveries observed in natural time series. Such dynamic indicators of resilience may be used to monitor the risk of systemic failure across systems ranging from organs to entire organisms. These tools invite a fundamental rethinking of our approach to the adaptive management of health and resilience.
Theories are among the most important tools of science. Lewin (1943) already noted “[t]here is nothing as practical as a good theory”. Although psychologists discussed problems of theory in their discipline for a long time, weak theories are still widespread in most subfields. One possible reason for this is that psychologists lack the tools to systematically assess the quality of their theories. Thagard (1989) developed a computational model for formal theory evaluation based on the concept of explanatory coherence. However, there are possible improvements to Thagard’s (1989) model and it is not available in software that psychologists typically use. Therefore, we developed a new implementation of explanatory coherence based on the Ising model. We demonstrate the capabilities of this new Ising Model of Explanatory Coherence (IMEC) on several examples from psychology and other sciences. It is also available in the R-package IMEC so that it can help scientists to evaluate the quality of their theories in practice.
Given the heterogeneity of autism spectrum disorder, an important limitation of much autism spectrum disorder research is that outcome measures are statistically modeled as separate dependent variables. Often, their multivariate structure is either ignored or treated as a nuisance. This study aims to lift this limitation by applying network analysis to explicate the multivariate pattern of risk and success factors for subjective well-being in autism spectrum disorder. We estimated a network structure for 27 potential factors in 2341 individuals with autism spectrum disorder to assess the centrality of specific life domains and their importance for well-being. The data included both self- and proxy-reported information. We identified social satisfaction and societal contribution as the strongest direct paths to subjective well-being. The results suggest that an important contribution to well-being lies in resources that allow the individual to engage in social relations, which influence well-being directly. Factors most important in determining the network's structure include self-reported IQ, living situation, level of daily activity, and happiness. Number of family members with autism spectrum disorder and openness about one's diagnosis are least important of all factors for subjective well-being. These types of results can serve as a roadmap for interventions directed at improving the well-being of individuals with autism spectrum disorder.
Is it possible to measure psychological attributes like intelligence, personality and attitudes and if so, how does that work? What does the term 'measurement' mean in a psychological context? This fascinating and timely book discusses these questions and investigates the possible answers that can be given response. Denny Borsboom provides an in-depth treatment of the philosophical foundations of widely used measurement models in psychology. The theoretical status of classical test theory, latent variable theory and positioned in terms of the underlying philosophy of science. Special attention is devoted to the central concept of test validity and future directions to improve the theory and practice of psychological measurement are outlined.
