Research on extra-sensory perception or psi is contentious and highly polarized. On the one hand, its proponents believe that evidence for psi is overwhelming, and they support their case with a seemingly impressive series of experiments and meta-analyses. On the other hand, psi skeptics believe that the phenomenon does not exist, and the claimed statistical support is entirely spurious. We are firmly in the camp of the skeptics. However, the main goal of this chapter is not to single out and critique individual experiments on psi. Instead, we wish to highlight the many positive consequences that psi research has had on more traditional empirical research, an influence that we hope and expect will continue in the future.
The following two tenets regarding validity are jointly untenable: (a) validity is sufficient for test interpretation and use and (b) validity involves only a
In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett's (1987) notion of real patterns , and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.
Background International guidelines present overall symptom severity as the key dimension for clinical characterisation of major depressive disorder (MDD). However, differences may reside within severity levels related to how symptoms interact in an individual patient, called symptom dynamics. Aims To investigate these individual differences by estimating the proportion of patients that display differences in their symptom dynamics while sharing the same overall symptom severity. Method Participants with MDD ( n = 73; mean age 34.6 years, s.d. = 13.1; 56.2% female) rated their baseline symptom severity using the Inventory for Depressive Symptomatology Self-Report (IDS-SR). Momentary indicators for depressive symptoms were then collected through ecological momentary assessments five times per day for 28 days; 8395 observations were conducted (average per person: 115; s.d. = 16.8). Each participant's symptom dynamics were estimated using person-specific dynamic network models. Individual differences in these symptom relationship patterns in groups of participants sharing the same symptom severity levels were estimated using individual network invariance tests. Subsequently, the overall proportion of participants that displayed differential symptom dynamics while sharing the same symptom severity was calculated. A supplementary simulation study was conducted to investigate the accuracy of our methodology against false-positive results. Results Differential symptom dynamics were identified across 63.0% (95% bootstrapped CI 41.0–82.1) of participants within the same severity group. The average false detection of individual differences was 2.2%. Conclusions The majority of participants within the same depressive symptom severity group displayed differential symptom dynamics. Examining symptom dynamics provides information about person-specific psychopathological expression beyond severity levels by revealing how symptoms aggravate each other over time. These results suggest that symptom dynamics may be a promising new dimension for clinical characterisation, warranting replication in independent samples. To inform personalised treatment planning, a next step concerns linking different symptom relationship patterns to treatment response and clinical course, including patterns related to spontaneous recovery and forms of disorder progression.
Asay (2018) criticizes our contention that psychologists do best to adhere to a substantive theory of correspondence truth. He argues that deflationary theory can serve the same purposes as correspondence theory. In the present article we argue that (a) scientific realism, broadly construed, requires a version of correspondence theory and (b) contrary to Asay’s suggestion, correspondence theory does have important additional resources over deflationary accounts in its ability to support generalizations over classes of true sentences.
Because indirect measures of personality self–concepts such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) allow tapping into automatic processes, they can offer advantages over self–report measures. However, prior investigations have led to mixed results regarding the validity of indirect measures of conscientiousness. We suggest that these results might be due to a failure to consider the different facets of conscientiousness. These facets are of crucial importance because they are associated differentially with other psychobiological constructs and they are also characterized by different mechanisms. Therefore, focusing on facets while developing indirect measures of conscientiousness may improve the validity of such measures. In Study 1, we conducted a psycholexical investigation to develop one IAT for each conscientiousness facet. In Study 2, we examined the convergent and discriminant validities of each facet IAT in relation to self–report measures, peer–report measures and self–report behavioural indicators, and we investigated differential associations of the conscientiousness facets with working memory capacity and self–control. We employed network analysis as a novel approach to elucidate differential relationships involving personality facets. The results corroborated the convergent and discriminant validity of the conscientiousness facet IATs with self–reports and showed that the conscientiousness facets were differentially associated with working memory capacity and with self–control. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology
Forbes, Wright, Markon, and Krueger (2017) stated that "psychopathology networks have limited replicability" (p. 1011) and that "popular network analysis methods produce unreliable results" (p. 1011). These conclusions are based on an assessment of the replicability of four different network models for symptoms of major depression and generalized anxiety across two samples; in addition, Forbes et al. analyzed the stability of the network models within the samples using split-halves. Our reanalysis of the same data with the same methods led to results directly opposed to theirs: All network models replicated very well across the two data sets and across the split-halves. We trace the differences between Forbes et al.'s results and our own to the fact that they did not appear to accurately implement all network models and used debatable metrics to assess replicability. In particular, they deviated from existing estimation routines for relative importance networks, did not acknowledge the fact that the skip structure used in the interviews strongly distorted correlations between symptoms, and incorrectly assumed that network structures and metrics should be the same not only across the different samples but also across the different network models used. In addition to a comprehensive reanalysis of the data, we end with a discussion of best practices concerning future research into the replicability of psychometric networks. (PsycINFO Database Record
This paper aims to improve theory formation in psychology by developing a practical methodology for constructing explanatory theories: Theory Construction Methodology (TCM). TCM is a sequence of five steps. First, the theorist identifies empirical phenomena to become the target of explanation. Second, the theorist constructs a proto-theory: a set of theoretical principles that potentially explain these phenomena. Third, the proto-theory is used to construct a formal model: a set of model equations or simulation models that encode the explanatory principles. Fourth, the theorist investigates this model’s explanatory adequacy. This is done by formalizing the empirical phenomena in terms of the model, and assessing whether the model indeed reproduces them. Fifth, the theorist studies the overall adequacy of the theory by evaluating whether phenomena are indeed reproduced faithfully, whether explanatory principles are parsimonious and substantively plausible, and whether the theory implies new predictions to promote further research. We illustrate TCM with an example taken from the intelligence literature (the mutualism model of intelligence), discuss the place of TCM in the larger scheme of scientific research, and propose an outline for a university curriculum that can systematically educate psychologists in the process of theory formation.