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Abstract Computational psychiatry is a burgeoning field that uses formal models of brain function to characterize the mechanisms of psychopathology, with the hope that these mechanistic views can generate objective and predictive targets for treatment and intervention. This chapter introduces relevant key concepts and rationale relevant for computational psychiatry. It focuses on the Bayesian brain framework as an example to demonstrate how computational theories and models can account for false beliefs observed across many mental disorders. This framework is also compared with other formal theories of the brain. Specifically, the chapter reviews findings on delusions in schizophrenia as an example of false sensory inference; it also uses false interoceptive and interpersonal inference in autism to demonstrate the impact of faulty inference during neurodevelopment. The chapter concludes by summarizing the status quo of the field and noting future directions of research.
This paper introduces a novel approach for modelling time-varying connectivity in neuroimaging data, focusing on the slow fluctuations in synaptic efficacy that mediate neuronal dynamics. Building on the framework of Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM), we propose a method that incorporates temporal basis functions into neural models, allowing for the explicit representation of slow parameter changes. This approach balances expressivity and computational efficiency by modelling these fluctuations as a Gaussian process, offering a middle ground between existing methods that either strongly constrain or excessively relax parameter fluctuations. We validate the ensuing model through simulations and real data from an auditory roving oddball paradigm, demonstrating its potential to explain key aspects of brain dynamics. This work aims to equip researchers with a robust tool for investigating time-varying connectivity, particularly in the context of synaptic modulation and its role in both healthy and pathological brain function.
This dataset includes skin conductance response (SCR) measurements, keypress responses and keypress response times to acoustic stimuli for each of 24 healthy unmedicated participants (12 males and 12 females aged 24+/-4.6 years, identical sample as in SCRV_1). The stimuli are 1s long white noise bursts at 95dB presented over headphones. Mean ISI is varied in a block-wise fashion (3s, 9s, 19s). The experiment follows a single factorial design with three levels of the mean ISI.
Normative models of human cognition often appeal to Bayesian filtering, which provides optimal online estimates of unknown or hidden states of the world, based on previous observations. However, in many cases it is necessary to optimise beliefs about sequences of states rather than just the current state. Importantly, Bayesian filtering and sequential inference strategies make different predictions about beliefs and subsequent choices, rendering them behaviourally dissociable. Taking data from a probabilistic reversal task we show that subjects' choices provide strong evidence that they are representing short sequences of states. Between-subject measures of this implicit sequential inference strategy had a neurobiological underpinning and correlated with grey matter density in prefrontal and parietal cortex, as well as the hippocampus. Our findings provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence for sequential inference in human cognition, and by exploiting between-subject variation in this measure we provide pointers to its neuronal substrates.
This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution.
Active inference is a general framework for perception and action that is gaining prominence in computational and systems neuroscience but is less known outside these fields. Here, we discuss a proof-of-principle implementation of the active inference scheme for the control or the 7-DoF arm of a (simulated) PR2 robot. By manipulating visual and proprioceptive noise levels, we show under which conditions robot control under the active inference scheme is accurate. Besides accurate control, our analysis of the internal system dynamics (e.g. the dynamics of the hidden states that are inferred during the inference) sheds light on key aspects of the framework such as the quintessentially multimodal nature of control and the differential roles of proprioception and vision. In the discussion, we consider the potential importance of being able to implement active inference in robots. In particular, we briefly review the opportunities for modelling psychophysiological phenomena such as sensory attenuation and related failures of gain control, of the sort seen in Parkinson's disease. We also consider the fundamental difference between active inference and optimal control formulations, showing that in the former the heavy lifting shifts from solving a dynamical inverse problem to creating deep forward or generative models with dynamics, whose attracting sets prescribe desired behaviours.
Open in new tabDownload slideFrom a systems biology perspective, the brain and spinal cord are interwoven with the body: they are 'embodied'. Freund et al. propose an integrative framework based on biophysical models that aims to characterize neurological disorders and minimize their impact on patients by considering functional interactions between supra-spinal, spinal and peripheral regions simultaneously.
