Analytic tools for psychophysiological signals often make implicit assumptions that are unspecified. In developing a mathematical framework for analysis of skin conductance responses [SCRs], we formalise our assumptions by positing that SCRs can be regarded as the output of a linear time-invariant filter. Here, we provide an empirical test of these assumptions. Our findings indicate that a large component of the variance in SCRs can be explained by one response function per individual. We note that baseline variance (i.e. variance in the absence of evoked responses) is higher than variance that could not be explained by a linear time-invariant model of evoked responses. Furthermore, there was no evidence for nonlinear interactions among evoked responses that depended on their temporal overlap. We develop a canonical response function and show that it can be used for signals from different recording sites. We discuss the implications of these observations for model-based analysis of SCRs.
Abstract Integrating the predictive processing framework into our understanding of motivation offers promising avenues for theoretical development, while shedding light on the computational processes underlying motivated behavior. Here we decompose expected free energy into intrinsic value (i.e., epistemic affordance) and extrinsic value (i.e., instrumental affordance) to provide insights into how individuals adapt to and interact with their environment.
Event-related skin conductance responses (SCRs) are traditionally analysed by comparing the amplitude of individual peaks against a pre-stimulus baseline. Many experimental manipulations in cognitive neuroscience dictate paradigms with short inter trial intervals, precluding accurate baseline estimation for SCR measurements. Here, we present a novel and general approach to SCR analysis, derived from methods used in neuroimaging that estimate responses using a linear convolution model. In effect, the method obviates peak-scoring and makes use of the full SCR. We demonstrate, across three experiments, that the method has face validity in analysing reactions to a loud white noise and emotional pictures, can be generalised to paradigms where the shape of the response function is unknown and can account for parametric trial-by-trial effects. We suggest our approach provides greater flexibility in analysing SCRs than existing methods.
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance - in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations - is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account: an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
In this Review, we discuss advances in computational neuroscience that relate to psychiatry. We review computational psychiatry in terms of the ambitions of investigators, emerging domains of application, and future work. Our focus is on theoretical formulations of brain function that put subjective beliefs and behaviour within formal (computational) frameworks—frameworks that can be grounded in neurophysiology down to the level of synaptic mechanisms. Understanding the principles that underlie the brain's functional architecture might be essential for an informed phenotyping of psychopathology in terms of its pathophysiological underpinnings. We focus on active (Bayesian) inference and predictive coding. Specifically, we show how basic principles of neuronal computation can be used to explain psychopathology, ranging from impoverished theory of mind in autism to abnormalities of smooth pursuit eye movements in schizophrenia.
This dataset includes skin conductance response (SCR) measurements recorded from 3 locations (see section 'Data files' below) for each of 26 healthy unmedicated participants (12 males and 14 females aged 24.4+/-4.9 years) in response to an auditory stimulus (single white noise bursts, 1s length; 10ms ramp; ~85dB). Participants are asked to press a foot pedal upon hearing a stimulus.
This paper provides a concise description of the free energy principle, starting from a formulation of random dynamical systems in terms of a Langevin equation and ending with a Bayesian mechanics that can be read as a physics of sentience. It rehearses the key steps using standard results from statistical physics. These steps entail (i) establishing a particular partition of states based upon conditional independencies that inherit from sparsely coupled dynamics, (ii) unpacking the implications of this partition in terms of Bayesian inference and (iii) describing the paths of particular states with a variational principle of least action. Teleologically, the free energy principle offers a normative account of self-organisation in terms of optimal Bayesian design and decision-making, in the sense of maximising marginal likelihood or Bayesian model evidence. In summary, starting from a description of the world in terms of random dynamical systems, we end up with a description of self-organisation as sentient behaviour that can be interpreted as self-evidencing; namely, self-assembly, autopoiesis or active inference.
Self-supervised learning has become an increasingly important paradigm in the domain of machine intelligence. Furthermore, evidence for self-supervised adaptation, such as contrastive formulations, has emerged in recent computational neuroscience and brain-inspired research. Nevertheless, current work on self-supervised learning relies on biologically implausible credit assignment -- in the form of backpropagation of errors -- and feedforward inference, typically a forward-locked pass. Predictive coding, in its mechanistic form, offers a biologically plausible means to sidestep these backprop-specific limitations. However, unsupervised predictive coding rests on learning a generative model of raw pixel input (akin to ``generative AI'' approaches), which entails predicting a potentially high dimensional input; on the other hand, supervised predictive coding, which learns a mapping between inputs to target labels, requires human annotation, and thus incurs the drawbacks of supervised learning. In this work, we present a scheme for self-supervised learning within a neurobiologically plausible framework that appeals to the free energy principle, constructing a new form of predictive coding that we call meta-representational predictive coding (MPC). MPC sidesteps the need for learning a generative model of sensory input (e.g., pixel-level features) by learning to predict representations of sensory input across parallel streams, resulting in an encoder-only learning and inference scheme. This formulation rests on active inference (in the form of sensory glimpsing) to drive the learning of representations, i.e., the representational dynamics are driven by sequences of decisions made by the model to sample informative portions of its sensorium.
<ns4:p>By equipping a previously reported dynamic causal modelling of COVID-19 with an isolation state, we were able to model the effects of self-isolation consequent on testing and tracking. Specifically, we included a quarantine or isolation state occupied by people who believe they might be infected but are asymptomatic—and could only leave if they test negative. We recovered <ns4:italic>maximum posteriori</ns4:italic> estimates of the model parameters using time series of new cases, daily deaths, and tests for the UK. These parameters were used to simulate the trajectory of the outbreak in the UK over an 18-month period. Several clear-cut conclusions emerged from these simulations. For example, under plausible (graded) relaxations of social distancing, a rebound of infections is highly unlikely. The emergence of a second wave depends almost exclusively on the rate at which we lose immunity, inherited from the first wave. There exists no testing strategy that can attenuate mortality rates, other than by deferring or delaying a second wave. A testing and tracking policy—implemented at the present time—will defer any second wave beyond a time horizon of 18 months. Crucially, this deferment is within current testing capabilities (requiring an efficacy of tracing and tracking of about 20% of asymptomatic infected cases, with 50,000 tests per day). These conclusions are based upon a dynamic causal model for which we provide some construct and face validation—using a comparative analysis of the United Kingdom and Germany, supplemented with recent serological studies.</ns4:p>
Abstract Macroscopic studies of cortical tissue reveal a prevalence of oscillatory activity, that reflect a fine tuning of neural interactions. This research extends neural field theories by incorporating generalized oscillatory dynamics into previous work on conservative or semi-conservative neural field dynamics. Prior studies have largely assumed isotropic connections among neural units; however, this study demonstrates that a broad range of anisotropic and fluctuating connections can still sustain oscillations. Using Lagrangian field methods, we examine different types of connectivity, their dynamics, and potential interactions with neural fields. From this theoretical foundation, we derive a framework that incorporates Hebbian and non-Hebbian learning – i.e., plasticity – into the study of neural fields via the concept of a connectivity field.
