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Recent characterisations of self-organising systems depend upon the presence of a 'Markov blanket': a statistical boundary that mediates the interactions between the inside and outside of a system. We leverage this idea to provide an analysis of partitions in neuronal systems. This is applicable to brain architectures at multiple scales, enabling partitions into single neurons, brain regions, and brain-wide networks. This treatment is based upon the canonical micro-circuitry used in empirical studies of effective connectivity, so as to speak directly to practical applications. The notion of effective connectivity depends upon the dynamic coupling between functional units, whose form recapitulates that of a Markov blanket at each level of analysis. The nuance afforded by partitioning neural systems in this way highlights certain limitations of 'modular' perspectives of brain function that only consider a single level of description.
This paper introduces an active inference formulation of planning and navigation. It illustrates how the exploitation–exploration dilemma is dissolved by acting to minimise uncertainty (i.e. expected surprise or free energy). We use simulations of a maze problem to illustrate how agents can solve quite complicated problems using context sensitive prior preferences to form subgoals. Our focus is on how epistemic behaviour—driven by novelty and the imperative to reduce uncertainty about the world—contextualises pragmatic or goal-directed behaviour. Using simulations, we illustrate the underlying process theory with synthetic behavioural and electrophysiological responses during exploration of a maze and subsequent navigation to a target location. An interesting phenomenon that emerged from the simulations was a putative distinction between 'place cells'—that fire when a subgoal is reached—and 'path cells'—that fire until a subgoal is reached.
This paper describes a path integral formulation of the free energy principle. The ensuing account expresses the paths or trajectories that a particle takes as it evolves over time. The main results are a method or principle of least action that can be used to emulate the behaviour of particles in open exchange with their external milieu. Particles are defined by a particular partition, in which internal states are individuated from external states by active and sensory blanket states. The variational principle at hand allows one to interpret internal dynamics - of certain kinds of particles - as inferring external states that are hidden behind blanket states. We consider different kinds of particles, and to what extent they can be imbued with an elementary form of inference or sentience. Specifically, we consider the distinction between dissipative and conservative particles, inert and active particles and, finally, ordinary and strange particles. Strange particles can be described as inferring their own actions, endowing them with apparent autonomy or agency. In short - of the kinds of particles afforded by a particular partition - strange kinds may be apt for describing sentient behaviour.
The aim of this note is to revisit the analysis of conjunctions in imaging data. We review some conceptual issues that have emerged from recent discussion (Nichols, T., Brett, M., Andersson, J., Wager, T., Poline, J.-B., 2004. Valid Conjunction Inference with the Minimum Statistic.) and reformulate the conjunction of null hypotheses as a conjunction of k or more effects. Analyses based on minimum statistics have typically used the null hypothesis that k = 0. This enables inferences about one or more effects (k > 0). However, this does not provide control over false-positive rates (FPR) for inferences about a conjunction of k = n effects, over n tests. This is the key point made by Nichols et al., who suggest a procedure based on supremum P values that provides an upper bound on FPR for k = n. Although valid, this is a very conservative procedure, particularly in the context of multiple comparisons. We suggest that an inference on a conjunction of k = n effects is generally unnecessary and distinguish between congruent contrasts that test for the same treatment and incongruent contrasts of the sort used in cognitive conjunctions. For congruent contrasts, the usual inference, k > 0, is sufficient. With incongruent contrasts it is sufficient to infer a conjunction of k > u effects, where u is the number of contrasts that share some uninteresting effect. The issues highlighted by Nichols et al., have important implications for the design and analysis of cognitive conjunction studies and have motivated a change to the SPM software, that affords a test for the more general hypothesis k > u. This more general conjunction test is described.
Abstract This paper offers a formal account of emotional inference and stress-related behaviour, using the notion of active inference. We formulate responses to stressful scenarios in terms of Bayesian belief-updating and subsequent policy selection; namely, planning as (active) inference. Using a minimal model of how creatures or subjects account for their sensations (and subsequent action), we deconstruct the sequences of belief updating and behaviour that underwrite stress-related responses – and simulate the aberrant responses of the sort seen in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Crucially, the model used for belief-updating generates predictions in multiple (exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive) modalities, to provide an integrated account of evidence accumulation and multimodal integration that has consequences for both motor and autonomic responses. The ensuing phenomenology speaks to many constructs in the ecological and clinical literature on stress, which we unpack with reference to simulated inference processes and accompanying neuronal responses. A key insight afforded by this formal approach rests on the trade-off between the epistemic affordance of certain cues (that resolve uncertainty about states of affairs in the environment) and the consequences of epistemic foraging (that may be in conflict with the instrumental or pragmatic value of ‘fleeing’ or ‘freezing’). Starting from first principles, we show how this trade-off is nuanced by prior (subpersonal) beliefs about the outcomes of behaviour – beliefs that, when held with unduly high precision, can lead to (Bayes optimal) responses that closely resemble PTSD.
Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design - such as "minimal search" criteria from theoretical syntax - adhere to the FEP. This affords a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP - with respect to higher language functions - and offers linguistics a grounding in first principles with respect to computability. We show how both tree-geometric depth and a Kolmogorov complexity estimate (recruiting a Lempel-Ziv compression algorithm) can be used to accurately predict legal operations on syntactic workspaces, directly in line with formulations of variational free energy minimization. This is used to motivate a general principle of language design that we term Turing-Chomsky Compression (TCC). We use TCC to align concerns of linguists with the normative account of self-organization furnished by the FEP, by marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference.
This paper proposes a formal reconstruction of the script construct by leveraging the active inference framework, a behavioral modeling framework that casts action, perception, emotions, and attention as processes of (Bayesian or variational) inference. We propose a first principles account of the script construct that integrates its different uses in the behavioral and social sciences. We begin by reviewing the recent literature that uses the script construct. We then examine the main mathematical and computational features of active inference. Finally, we leverage the resources of active inference to offer a formal model of scripts. Our integrative model accounts for the dual nature of scripts (as internal, psychological schema used by agents to make sense of event types and as constitutive behavioral categories that make up the social order) and also for the stronger and weaker conceptions of the construct (which do and do not relate to explicit action sequences, respectively).
No abstract is provided for this article.
A scientific paradigmatic account suffices to interpret behavioral evolution in early Homo. Cognitive surprises, favoring anomalous behavioral propensities to sporadic expression, can explain “snakes-and-ladders” appearances and disappearances of Paleolithic skills in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record. The account applies the principle of stationary action, which underpins the free energy principle, to self-organizing systems at an evolutionary timescale. Unusual personal attainments, often explained by invoking progressive ascent of evolutionary phylogenetic “ladders” of cognitive and technical abilities, could be disregarded in a hominin community that failed to imagine or articulate possible advantages for its survivability. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, could erase from collective memory the recollection of exceptional individual conduct which disappeared down a “snake”, so to speak, of the human evolutionary “puzzle”. The puzzle discomforts paleoanthropologists. Some explain it away with the self-justifying assertion that separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed cognitive abilities that allegedly underlay the differential presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of particular behavioral outcomes or skills. An alternative methodological perspective, grounded in the fundamental relationships between organisms and their environments, affords a parsimonious, prosaic, deflationary account for appearances and disappearances of behavioral outcomes and skills.
In neuroimaging, functional mapping usually implies mapping function into an anatomical space, for example, using statistical parametric mapping to identify activation foci, or the characterization of distributed changes with spatial modes (eigenimages or principal components) (Friston et al., 1993a). This article is about a complementary approach, namely, mapping anatomy into a functional space. We describe a simple variant of multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis; Gower, 1966) that uses functional connectivity as its metric. The scaling transformation maps anatomy into a functional space. The topography, or proximity relationships, in this space embody the functional connectivity among brain regions. The higher the functional connectivity, the closer the regions. Functional connectivity is defined here as the correlation between remote neurophysiological events. The technique represents a descriptive characterization of anatomically distributed changes in the brain that reveals the structure of corticocortical interactions in terms of functional correlations. To illustrate the approach we have analyzed data from normal subjects and schizophrenic patients obtained with PET during the performance of word generation tasks. In particular, we focus on prefrontotemporal integration in normal subjects and show that, in schizophrenia, the left temporal regions and prefrontal cortex evidence abnormal functional connectivity.
This paper introduces variational representational similarity analysis RSA (vRSA) for electromagnetic recordings of neural responses (e.g., EEG, MEG, ECoG or LFP). Variational RSA is a Bayesian approach for testing whether the similarity of stimuli or experimental conditions is expressed in univariate or multivariate neural recordings. Extending an approach previously introduced in the context of functional MRI, vRSA decomposes the condition-by-condition data covariance matrix into hypothesised effects and observation noise, thereby casting RSA as a covariance component estimation problem. In this context, peristimulus time may be treated as an experimental factor, enabling one to test for the probability that different experimental effects are expressed in data at different times. Variational Bayesian methods are used for model estimation and model comparison, which confer a number of advantages over classical approaches, including statistically efficient hypothesis testing, quantification of uncertainty using Bayesian credible intervals and computational efficiency. After introducing the theory, we provide a worked example using openly available EEG data. Software functions implementing vRSA for the SPM software package accompany this paper, together with exemplar analysis scripts.
Abstract Autism is a psychiatric syndrome characterized by impairments in three domains: social interaction, communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests. Recent findings implicate the amygdala in the neurobiology of autism. In this paper, we report the results of a series of novel experimental investigations focusing on the structure and function of the amygdala in a group of children with autism. The first section attempts to determine if abnormality of the amygdala can be identified in an individual using magnetic resonance imaging in vivo. Using single-case voxel-based morphometric analyses, abnormality in the amygdala was detected in half the children with autism. Abnormalities in other regions were also found. In the second section, emotional modulation of the startle response was investigated in the group of autistic children. Surprisingly, there were no significant differences between the patterns of emotional modulation of the startle response in the autistic group compared with the controls.
