Publications

How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an ‘epistemic arc’, consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call ‘aesthetic’. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters—at the expense of affective aspects—and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)—at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives’.

The organization of consciousness is described through increasingly rich theoretical models. We review evidence that working memory capacity—essential to generating consciousness in the cerebral cortex—is supported by dual limbic memory systems. These dorsal (Papez) and ventral (Yakovlev) limbic networks provide the basis for mnemonic processing and prediction in the dorsal and ventral divisions of the human neocortex. Empirical evidence suggests that the dorsal limbic division is (i) regulated preferentially by excitatory feedforward control, (ii) consolidated by REM sleep, and (iii) controlled in waking by phasic arousal through lemnothalamic projections from the pontine brainstem reticular activating system. The ventral limbic division and striatum, (i) organizes the inhibitory neurophysiology of NREM to (ii) consolidate explicit memory in sleep, (iii) operating in waking cognition under the same inhibitory feedback control supported by collothalamic tonic activation from the midbrain. We propose that (i) these dual (excitatory and inhibitory) systems alternate in the stages of sleep, and (ii) in waking they must be balanced—at criticality—to optimize the active inference that generates conscious experiences. Optimal Bayesian belief updating rests on balanced feedforward (excitatory predictive) and feedback (inhibitory corrective) control biases that play the role of prior and likelihood (i.e., sensory) precision. Because the excitatory (E) phasic arousal and inhibitory (I) tonic activation systems that regulate these dual limbic divisions have distinct affective properties, varying levels of elation for phasic arousal (E) and anxiety for tonic activation (I), the dual control systems regulate sleep and consciousness in ways that are adaptively balanced—around the entropic nadir of E–I criticality—for optimal self-regulation of consciousness and psychological health. Because they are emotive as well as motive control systems, these dual systems have unique qualities of feeling that may be registered as subjective experience.

Knowing how another's preferences relate to our own is a central aspect of everyday decision-making, yet how the brain performs this transformation is unclear. Here, we ask whether the putative role of the hippocampal-entorhinal system in transforming relative and absolute spatial coordinates during navigation extends to transformations in abstract decision spaces. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects learned a stranger's preference for an everyday activity-relative to one of three personally known individuals-and subsequently decided how the stranger's preference relates to the other two individuals' preferences. We observed entorhinal/subicular responses to the absolute distance between the ratings of the stranger and the familiar choice options. Notably, entorhinal/subicular signals were sensitive to which familiar individuals were being compared to the stranger. In contrast, striatal signals increased when accurately determining the ordinal position of choice options in relation to the stranger. Paralleling its role in navigation, these data implicate the entorhinal/subicular region in assimilating relatively coded knowledge within abstract metric spaces.

Inferring the intentions and beliefs of another is an ability that is fundamental for social and affiliative interactions. A substantial amount of empirical evidence suggests that making sense of another's intentional and belief states (i.e. theory of mind) relies on exteroceptive (e.g. visual and auditory) and proprioceptive (i.e. motor) signals. Yet, despite its pivotal role in the guidance of behaviour, the role of the observer's interoceptive (visceral) processing in understanding another's internal states remains unexplored. Predicting and keeping track of interoceptive bodily states - which inform intentions and beliefs that guide behaviour - is one of the fundamental purposes of the human brain. In this paper, we will focus on the role of interoceptive predictions, prescribed by the free energy principle, in making sense of internal states that cause another's behaviour. We will discuss how multimodal expectations induced at deep (high) hierarchical levels - that necessarily entail interoceptive predictions - contribute to inference about others that is at the heart of theory of mind.

Abstract We describe an asymmetric approach to fMRI and MEG/EEG fusion in which fMRI data are treated as empirical priors on electromagnetic sources, such that their influence depends on the MEG/EEG data, by virtue of maximizing the model evidence. This is important if the causes of the MEG/EEG signals differ from those of the fMRI signal. Furthermore, each suprathreshold fMRI cluster is treated as a separate prior, which is important if fMRI data reflect neural activity arising at different times within the EEG/MEG data. We present methodological considerations when mapping from a 3D fMRI Statistical Parametric Map to a 2D cortical surface and thence to the covariance components used within our Parametric Empirical Bayesian framework. Our previous introduction of a canonical (inverse‐normalized) cortical mesh also allows deployment of fMRI priors that live in a template space; for example, from a group analysis of different individuals. We evaluate the ensuing scheme with MEG and EEG data recorded simultaneously from 12 participants, using the same face‐processing paradigm under which independent fMRI data were obtained. Because the fMRI priors become part of the generative model, we use the model evidence to compare (i) multiple versus single, (ii) valid versus invalid, (iii) binary versus continuous, and (iv) variance versus covariance fMRI priors. For these data, multiple, valid, binary, and variance fMRI priors proved best for a standard Minimum Norm inversion. Interestingly, however, inversion using Multiple Sparse Priors benefited little from additional fMRI priors, suggesting that they already provide a sufficiently flexible generative model. Hum Brain Mapp, 2010. © 2010 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.

<ns4:p>We recently described a dynamic causal model of a COVID-19 outbreak within a single region. Here, we combine several instantiations of this (epidemic) model to create a (pandemic) model of viral spread among regions. Our focus is on a second wave of new cases that may result from loss of immunity—and the exchange of people between regions—and how mortality rates can be ameliorated under different strategic responses. In particular, we consider hard or soft social distancing strategies predicated on national (Federal) or regional (State) estimates of the prevalence of infection in the population. The modelling is demonstrated using timeseries of new cases and deaths from the United States to estimate the parameters of a factorial (compartmental) epidemiological model of each State and, crucially, coupling between States. Using Bayesian model reduction, we identify the effective connectivity between States that best explains the initial phases of the outbreak in the United States. Using the ensuing posterior parameter estimates, we then evaluate the likely outcomes of different policies in terms of mortality, working days lost due to lockdown and demands upon critical care. The provisional results of this modelling suggest that social distancing and loss of immunity are the two key factors that underwrite a return to endemic equilibrium.</ns4:p>

Work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry has an extensive and influential history, and has received increased attention recently, with the emergence of professional associations and a growing literature. In this paper, we review key advances in work on philosophy and psychiatry, and their related clinical implications. First, in understanding and categorizing mental disorder, both naturalist and normativist considerations are now viewed as important – psychiatric constructs necessitate a consideration of both facts and values. At a conceptual level, this integrative view encourages moving away from strict scientism to soft naturalism, while in clinical practice this facilitates both evidence‐based and values‐based mental health care. Second, in considering the nature of psychiatric science, there is now increasing emphasis on a pluralist approach, including ontological, explanatory and value pluralism. Conceptually, a pluralist approach acknowledges the multi‐level causal interactions that give rise to psychopathology, while clinically it emphasizes the importance of a broad range of “difference‐makers”, as well as a consideration of “lived experience” in both research and practice. Third, in considering a range of questions about the brain‐mind, and how both somatic and psychic factors contribute to the development and maintenance of mental disorders, conceptual and empirical work on embodied cognition provides an increasingly valuable approach. Viewing the brain‐mind as embodied, embedded and enactive offers a conceptual approach to the mind‐body problem that facilitates the clinical integration of advances in both cognitive‐affective neuroscience and phenomenological psychopathology.

This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and ‘forces’ that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness.

Abstract The moment‐to‐moment focus of our mind's eye results from a complex interplay of voluntary and involuntary influences on attention. Previous neuroimaging studies suggest that the brain networks of voluntary versus involuntary attention can be segregated into a frontal‐versus‐parietal or a dorsal‐versus‐ventral partition—although recent work suggests that the dorsal network may be involved in both bottom‐up and top‐down attention. Research with nonhuman primates has provided evidence that a key distinction between top‐down and bottom‐up attention may be the direction of connectivity between frontal and parietal areas. Whereas typical fMRI connectivity analyses cannot disambiguate the direction of connections, dynamic causal modeling (DCM) can model directionality. Using DCM, we provide new evidence that directed connections within the dorsal attention network are differentially modulated for voluntary versus involuntary attention. These results suggest that the intraparietal sulcus exerts a baseline inhibitory effect on the frontal eye fields that is strengthened during exogenous orienting and attenuated during endogenous orienting. Furthermore, the attenuation from endogenous attention occurs even with salient peripheral cues when those cues are known to be counter predictive. Thus, directed connectivity between frontal and parietal regions of the dorsal attention network is highly influenced by the type of attention that is engaged.