The body sends interoceptive visceral information through deep brain structures to the cerebral cortex. The insula cortex, organized in hierarchical modules, is the major cortical region receiving interoceptive afferents and contains visceral topographic maps. Yet, the biological significance of the insula's modular architecture in relation to deep brain regions remains unsolved. In this opinion, we propose the Insula Hierarchical Modular Adaptive Interoception Control (IMAC) model to suggest that insula modules (granular, dysgranular and agranular subregions), forming networks with prefrontal (supplementary motor area, dorsolateral and ventromedial cortices) and striatum (posterior, dorsomedial and ventromedial) subregions, are specialized for higher-order interoceptive representations, recruited in a context-dependent manner to support habitual, model-based and exploratory adaptive behavior. We then discuss how insula interoceptive representations, or metaceptions, could give rise to conscious interoceptive feelings built up from low-order visceral representations and associated basic emotions located in deep interoceptive brain structures.
Abstract The ability to conceptualize and understand one’s own affective states and responses – or “emotional awareness” (EA) – is reduced in multiple psychiatric populations; it is also positively correlated with a range of adaptive cognitive and emotional traits. While a growing body of work has investigated the neurocognitive basis of EA, the neurocomputational processes underlying this ability have received limited attention. Here, we present a formal Active Inference (AI) model of emotion conceptualization that can simulate the neurocomputational (Bayesian) processes associated with learning about emotion concepts and inferring the emotions one is feeling in a given moment. We validate the model and inherent constructs by showing (i) it can successfully acquire a repertoire of emotion concepts in its “childhood”, as well as (ii) acquire new emotion concepts in synthetic “adulthood,” and (iii) that these learning processes depend on early experiences, environmental stability, and habitual patterns of selective attention. These results offer a proof of principle that cognitive-emotional processes can be modeled formally, and highlight the potential for both theoretical and empirical extensions of this line of research on emotion and emotional disorders.
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In one of neuroimaging's key papers, Worsley et al. (1992) introduced the concept of a resolution element (resel) as an intuitive parametrisation of the roughness-adjusted search volume underlying random field theory's expression for corrected p-values. In another key development, Worsley and Friston (1995) showed that temporal correlation in a linear model reduced the effective degrees of freedom (eDF). Here, we illustrate a surprising connection between these quantities, which may have application to multiple comparison correction on data with elaborate statistical dependence that can make RFT over-conservative.
Abstract This paper introduces active listening, as a unified framework for synthesising and recognising speech. The notion of active listening inherits from active inference, which considers perception and action under one universal imperative: to maximise the evidence for our (generative) models of the world. First, we describe a generative model of spoken words that simulates (i) how discrete lexical, prosodic, and speaker attributes give rise to continuous acoustic signals; and conversely (ii) how continuous acoustic signals are recognised as words. The ‘active’ aspect involves (covertly) segmenting spoken sentences and borrows ideas from active vision. It casts speech segmentation as the selection of internal actions, corresponding to the placement of word boundaries. Practically, word boundaries are selected that maximise the evidence for an internal model of how individual words are generated. We establish face validity by simulating speech recognition and showing how the inferred content of a sentence depends on prior beliefs and background noise. Finally, we consider predictive validity by associating neuronal or physiological responses, such as the mismatch negativity and P300, with belief updating under active listening, which is greatest in the absence of accurate prior beliefs about what will be heard next.
Humans are highly proficient in learning about the environments in which they operate. They form flexible spatial representations of their surroundings that can be leveraged with ease during spatial foraging and navigation. To capture these abilities, we present a deep Active Inference model of goal-directed behavior, and the accompanying belief updating. Active Inference rests upon optimizing Bayesian beliefs to maximize model evidence or marginal likelihood. Bayesian beliefs are probability distributions over the causes of observable outcomes. These causes include an agent's actions, which enables one to treat planning as inference. We use simulations of a geocaching task to elucidate the belief updating-that underwrites spatial foraging-and the associated behavioral and neurophysiological responses. In a geocaching task, the aim is to find hidden objects in the environment using spatial coordinates. Here, synthetic agents learn about the environment via inference and learning (e.g., learning about the likelihoods of outcomes given latent states) to reach a target location, and then forage locally to discover the hidden object that offers clues for the next location.
