Abstract We compare two free energy functionals for active inference under Markov decision processes. One of these is a functional of beliefs about states and policies, but a function of observations, while the second is a functional of beliefs about all three. In the former ( expected free energy), prior beliefs about outcomes are not part of the generative model (because they are absorbed into the prior over policies). Conversely, in the second ( generalised free energy); priors over outcomes become an explicit component of the generative model. When using the free energy function, which is blind to counterfactual (i.e., future) observations, we equip the generative model with a prior over policies that ensure preferred (i.e., priors over) outcomes are realised. In other words, selected policies minimise uncertainty about future outcomes by minimising the free energy expected in the future. When using the free energy functional – that effectively treats counterfactual observations as hidden states – we show that policies are inferred or selected that realise prior preferences by minimising the free energy of future expectations. Interestingly, the form of posterior beliefs about policies (and associated belief updating) turns out to be identical under both formulations, but the quantities used to compute them are not.
Understanding information processing in the brain-and creating general-purpose artificial intelligence-are long-standing aspirations of scientists and engineers worldwide. The distinctive features of human intelligence are high-level cognition and control in various interactions with the world including the self, which are not defined in advance and are vary over time. The challenge of building human-like intelligent machines, as well as progress in brain science and behavioural analyses, robotics, and their associated theoretical formalisations, speaks to the importance of the world-model learning and inference. In this article, after briefly surveying the history and challenges of internal model learning and probabilistic learning, we introduce the free energy principle, which provides a useful framework within which to consider neuronal computation and probabilistic world models. Next, we showcase examples of human behaviour and cognition explained under that principle. We then describe symbol emergence in the context of probabilistic modelling, as a topic at the frontiers of cognitive robotics. Lastly, we review recent progress in creating human-like intelligence by using novel probabilistic programming languages. The striking consensus that emerges from these studies is that probabilistic descriptions of learning and inference are powerful and effective ways to create human-like artificial intelligent machines and to understand intelligence in the context of how humans interact with their world.
This technical report describes the rationale and technical details for the dynamic causal modelling of mitigated epidemiological outcomes based upon a variety of timeseries data. It details the structure of the underlying convolution or generative model (at the time of writing on 6-Nov-20). This report is intended for use as a reference that accompanies the predictions in following dashboard: this https URL
This paper considers agency in the setting of embodied or active inference. In brief, we associate a sense of agency with prior beliefs about action and ask what sorts of beliefs underlie optimal behavior. In particular, we consider prior beliefs that action minimizes the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between desired states and attainable states in the future. This allows one to formulate bounded rationality as approximate Bayesian inference that optimizes a free energy bound on model evidence. We show that constructs like expected utility, exploration bonuses, softmax choice rules and optimism bias emerge as natural consequences of this formulation. Previous accounts of active inference have focused on predictive coding and Bayesian filtering schemes for minimizing free energy. Here, we consider variational Bayes as an alternative scheme that provides formal constraints on the computational anatomy of inference and action-constraints that are remarkably consistent with neuroanatomy. Furthermore, this scheme contextualizes optimal decision theory and economic (utilitarian) formulations as pure inference problems. For example, expected utility theory emerges as a special case of free energy minimization, where the sensitivity or inverse temperature (of softmax functions and quantal response equilibria) has a unique and Bayes-optimal solution-that minimizes free energy. This sensitivity corresponds to the precision of beliefs about behavior, such that attainable goals are afforded a higher precision or confidence. In turn, this means that optimal behavior entails a representation of confidence about outcomes that are under an agent's control.
The hippocampus is crucial for episodic memory, but it is also involved in online prediction. Evidence suggests that a unitary hippocampal code underlies both episodic memory and predictive processing, yet within a predictive coding framework the hippocampal-neocortical interactions that accompany these two phenomena are distinct and opposing. Namely, during episodic recall, the hippocampus is thought to exert an excitatory influence on the neocortex, to reinstate activity patterns across cortical circuits. This contrasts with empirical and theoretical work on predictive processing, where descending predictions suppress prediction errors to 'explain away' ascending inputs via cortical inhibition. In this hypothesis piece, we attempt to dissolve this previously overlooked dialectic. We consider how the hippocampus may facilitate both prediction and memory, respectively, by inhibiting neocortical prediction errors or increasing their gain. We propose that these distinct processing modes depend upon the neuromodulatory gain (or precision) ascribed to prediction error units. Within this framework, memory recall is cast as arising from fictive prediction errors that furnish training signals to optimise generative models of the world, in the absence of sensory data.
We summarize our recently introduced Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf et al. 2017) and relate it to outstanding conceptual issues in the theory of consciousness. The PCM combines a projective geometrical model of the perspectival phenomenological structure of the field of consciousness with a variational Free Energy minimization model of active inference, yielding an account of the cybernetic function of consciousness, viz., the modulation of the field's cognitive and affective dynamics for the effective control of embodied agents. The geometrical and active inference components are linked via the concept of projective transformation, which is crucial to understanding how conscious organisms integrate perception, emotion, memory, reasoning, and perspectival imagination in order to control behavior, enhance resilience, and optimize preference satisfaction. The PCM makes substantive empirical predictions and fits well into a (neuro)computationalist framework. It also helps us to account for aspects of subjective character that are sometimes ignored or conflated: pre-reflective self-consciousness, the first-person point of view, the sense of minenness or ownership, and social self-consciousness. We argue that the PCM, though still in development, offers us the most complete theory to date of what Thomas Metzinger has called "phenomenal selfhood".
In this note, we revisit earlier work on false discovery rate (FDR) and evaluate it in relation to topological inference in statistical parametric mapping. We note that controlling the false discovery rate of voxels is not equivalent to controlling the false discovery rate of activations. This is a problem that is unique to inference on images, in which the underlying signal is continuous (i.e., signal which does not have a compact support). In brief, inference based on conventional voxel-wise FDR procedures is not appropriate for inferences on the topological features of a statistical parametric map (SPM), such as peaks or regions of activation. We describe the nature of the problem, illustrate it with some examples and suggest a simple solution based on controlling the false discovery rate of connected excursion sets within an SPM, characterised by their volume.
Conference Abstract| August 01 2001 Attention to Action: Specific Modulation of Cortico-Cortical Connectivity Measured Using FMRI Jame B Rowe; Jame B Rowe 1Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Karl Friston; Karl Friston 1Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Richard Frackowiak; Richard Frackowiak 1Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Richard Passingham Richard Passingham 1Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Clin Sci (Lond) (2001) 101 (s45): 13P. https://doi.org/10.1042/cs101013Pb Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Cite Icon Cite Get Permissions Citation Jame B Rowe, Karl Friston, Richard Frackowiak, Richard Passingham; Attention to Action: Specific Modulation of Cortico-Cortical Connectivity Measured Using FMRI. Clin Sci (Lond) 1 August 2001; 101 (s45): 13P. doi: https://doi.org/10.1042/cs101013Pb Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll JournalsClinical Science Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2001 The Biochemical Society and the Medical Research Society2001 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.