This monograph attempts a theory of every 'thing' that can be distinguished from other things in a statistical sense. The ensuing statistical independencies, mediated by Markov blankets, speak to a recursive composition of ensembles (of things) at increasingly higher spatiotemporal scales. This decomposition provides a description of small things; e.g., quantum mechanics - via the Schrodinger equation, ensembles of small things - via statistical mechanics and related fluctuation theorems, through to big things - via classical mechanics. These descriptions are complemented with a Bayesian mechanics for autonomous or active things. Although this work provides a formulation of every thing, its main contribution is to examine the implications of Markov blankets for self-organisation to nonequilibrium steady-state. In brief, we recover an information geometry and accompanying free energy principle that allows one to interpret the internal states of something as representing or making inferences about its external states. The ensuing Bayesian mechanics is compatible with quantum, statistical and classical mechanics and may offer a formal description of lifelike particles.
This paper examines intrinsic brain networks in light of recent developments in the characterisation of resting state fMRI timeseries--and simulations of neuronal fluctuations based upon the connectome. Its particular focus is on patterns or modes of distributed activity that underlie functional connectivity. We first demonstrate that the eigenmodes of functional connectivity--or covariance among regions or nodes--are the same as the eigenmodes of the underlying effective connectivity, provided we limit ourselves to symmetrical connections. This symmetry constraint is motivated by appealing to proximity graphs based upon multidimensional scaling. Crucially, the principal modes of functional connectivity correspond to the dynamically unstable modes of effective connectivity that decay slowly and show long term memory. Technically, these modes have small negative Lyapunov exponents that approach zero from below. Interestingly, the superposition of modes--whose exponents are sampled from a power law distribution--produces classical 1/f (scale free) spectra. We conjecture that the emergence of dynamical instability--that underlies intrinsic brain networks--is inevitable in any system that is separated from external states by a Markov blanket. This conjecture appeals to a free energy formulation of nonequilibrium steady-state dynamics. The common theme that emerges from these theoretical considerations is that endogenous fluctuations are dominated by a small number of dynamically unstable modes. We use this as the basis of a dynamic causal model (DCM) of resting state fluctuations--as measured in terms of their complex cross spectra. In this model, effective connectivity is parameterised in terms of eigenmodes and their Lyapunov exponents--that can also be interpreted as locations in a multidimensional scaling space. Model inversion provides not only estimates of edges or connectivity but also the topography and dimensionality of the underlying scaling space. Here, we focus on conceptual issues with simulated fMRI data and provide an illustrative application using an empirical multi-region timeseries.
Abstract It has been suggested that the brain controls hand movements via internal models that rely on visual and proprioceptive cues about the state of the hand. In active inference formulations of such models, the relative influence of each modality on action and perception is determined by how precise (reliable) it is expected to be. The ‘top-down’ affordance of expected precision to a particular sensory modality is associated with attention. Here, we asked whether increasing attention to (i.e., the precision of) vision or proprioception would enhance performance in a hand-target phase matching task, in which visual and proprioceptive cues about hand posture were incongruent. We show that in a simple simulated agent—based on predictive coding formulations of active inference—increasing the expected precision of vision or proprioception improved task performance (target matching with the seen or felt hand, respectively) under visuo-proprioceptive conflict. Moreover, we show that this formulation captured the behaviour and self-reported attentional allocation of human participants performing the same task in a virtual reality environment. Together, our results show that selective attention can balance the impact of (conflicting) visual and proprioceptive cues on action—rendering attention a key mechanism for a flexible body representation for action.
This paper asks whether Dynamic Causal modelling (DCM) can predict the long-term clinical impact of the COVID-19 epidemic. DCMs are designed to continually assimilate data and modify model parameters, such as transmissibility of the virus, changes in social distancing and vaccine coverage-to accommodate changes in population dynamics and virus behavior. But as a novel way to model epidemics do they produce valid predictions? We presented DCM predictions 12 months ago, which suggested an increase in viral transmission was accompanied by a reduction in pathogenicity. These changes provided plausible reasons why the model underestimated deaths, hospital admissions and acute-post COVID-19 syndrome by 20%. A further 12-month validation exercise could help to assess how useful such predictions are.
Predictive processing (e.g., predictive coding) is a predominant paradigm in cognitive neuroscience. This Primer considers the various levels of commitment neuroscientists have to the neuronal process theories that accompany the principles of predictive processing. Specifically, it reviews and contextualises a recent PLOS Biology study of alpha oscillations and travelling waves. We will see that alpha oscillations emerge naturally under the computational architectures implied by predictive coding-and may tell us something profound about recurrent message passing in brain hierarchies. Specifically, the bidirectional nature of forward and backward waves speaks to opportunities to understand attention and how it nuances bottom-up and top-down influences.
This paper considers psychotic symptoms in terms of false inferences or beliefs. It is based on the notion that the brain is an organ of inference that actively constructs hypotheses to explain or predict its sensations. This perspective provides a normative (Bayes optimal) account of action and perception that emphasises probabilistic representations; in particular, the confidence or precision of beliefs about the world. We consider sensory attenuation deficits, catatonia and delusions as various expressions of the same core pathology: namely, an aberrant encoding of precision in a predictive coding hierarchy. In predictive coding, precision is thought to be encoded by the postsynaptic gain of neurons reporting prediction error. This suggests that both pervasive trait abnormalities and florid failures of inference in the psychotic state can be linked to factors controlling postsynaptic gain-such as NMDA receptor function and (dopaminergic) neuromodulation. We illustrate these points using a biologically plausible simulation of attribution of agency-showing how a reduction in the precision of prior beliefs, relative to sensory evidence, can lead to false inference.
In this paper, we propose the use of bilinear dynamical systems (BDS)s for model-based deconvolution of fMRI time-series. The importance of this work lies in being able to deconvolve haemodynamic time-series, in an informed way, to disclose the underlying neuronal activity. Being able to estimate neuronal responses in a particular brain region is fundamental for many models of functional integration and connectivity in the brain. BDSs comprise a stochastic bilinear neurodynamical model specified in discrete time, and a set of linear convolution kernels for the haemodynamics. We derive an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm for parameter estimation, in which fMRI time-series are deconvolved in an E-step and model parameters are updated in an M-Step. We report preliminary results that focus on the assumed stochastic nature of the neurodynamic model and compare the method to Wiener deconvolution.
Reward is one of the most important influences shaping behavior. Single-unit recording and lesion studies in experimental animals have implicated a number of regions in response to reinforcing stimuli, in particular regions of the extended limbic system and the ventral striatum. In this experiment, functional neuroimaging was used to assess neural response within human reward systems under different psychological contexts. Nine healthy volunteers were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging during the performance of a gambling task with financial rewards and penalties. We demonstrated neural sensitivity of midbrain and ventral striatal regions to financial rewards and hippocampal sensitivity to financial penalties. Furthermore, we show that neural responses in globus pallidus, thalamus, and subgenual cingulate were specific to high reward levels occurring in the context of increasing reward. Responses to both reward level in the context of increasing reward and penalty level in the context of increasing penalty were seen in caudate, insula, and ventral prefrontal cortex. These results demonstrate dissociable neural responses to rewards and penalties that are dependent on the psychological context in which they are experienced.
Abstract We assess the suitability of conventional parametric statistics for analyzing oscillatory activity, as measured with electroencephalography/magnetoencephalography (EEG/MEG). The approach we consider is based on narrow‐band power time–frequency decompositions of single‐trial data. The ensuing power measures have a χ 2 ‐distribution. The use of the general linear model (GLM) under normal error assumptions is, therefore, difficult to motivate for these data. This is unfortunate because the GLM plays a central role in classical inference and is the standard estimation and inference framework for neuroimaging data. The key contribution of this work is to show that, in many circumstances, one can appeal to the central limit theorem and assume normality for generative models of power. If this is not appropriate, one can transform the data to render the error terms approximately normal. These considerations allow one to analyze induced and evoked oscillations using standard frameworks like statistical parametric mapping. We establish the validity of parametric tests using synthetic and real data and compare its performance to established nonparametric procedures. Hum Brain Mapp, 2005. © 2005 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
