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Mechanistic insight is achieved only when experiments are employed to test formal or computational models. Furthermore, in analogy to lesion studies, phantom perception may serve as a vehicle to understand the fundamental processing principles underlying healthy auditory perception. With a special focus on tinnitus-as the prime example of auditory phantom perception-we review recent work at the intersection of artificial intelligence, psychology and neuroscience. In particular, we discuss why everyone with tinnitus suffers from (at least hidden) hearing loss, but not everyone with hearing loss suffers from tinnitus. We argue that intrinsic neural noise is generated and amplified along the auditory pathway as a compensatory mechanism to restore normal hearing based on adaptive stochastic resonance. The neural noise increase can then be misinterpreted as auditory input and perceived as tinnitus. This mechanism can be formalized in the Bayesian brain framework, where the percept (posterior) assimilates a prior prediction (brain's expectations) and likelihood (bottom-up neural signal). A higher mean and lower variance (i.e. enhanced precision) of the likelihood shifts the posterior, evincing a misinterpretation of sensory evidence, which may be further confounded by plastic changes in the brain that underwrite prior predictions. Hence, two fundamental processing principles provide the most explanatory power for the emergence of auditory phantom perceptions: predictive coding as a top-down and adaptive stochastic resonance as a complementary bottom-up mechanism. We conclude that both principles also play a crucial role in healthy auditory perception. Finally, in the context of neuroscience-inspired artificial intelligence, both processing principles may serve to improve contemporary machine learning techniques.
We have previously tried to explain perceptual inference and learning under a free-energy principle that pursues Helmholtz's agenda to understand the brain in terms of energy minimization. It is fairly easy to show that making inferences about the causes of sensory data can be cast as the minimization of a free-energy bound on the likelihood of sensory inputs, given an internal model of how they were caused. In this article, we consider what would happen if the data themselves were sampled to minimize this bound. It transpires that the ensuing active sampling or inference is mandated by ergodic arguments based on the very existence of adaptive agents. Furthermore, it accounts for many aspects of motor behavior; from retinal stabilization to goal-seeking. In particular, it suggests that motor control can be understood as fulfilling prior expectations about proprioceptive sensations. This formulation can explain why adaptive behavior emerges in biological agents and suggests a simple alternative to optimal control theory. We illustrate these points using simulations of oculomotor control and then apply to same principles to cued and goal-directed movements. In short, the free-energy formulation may provide an alternative perspective on the motor control that places it in an intimate relationship with perception.
Coregistration of functional PET and T1--weighted MR images is a necessary step for combining functional information from PET images with anatomical information in MR images. Several coregistration algorithms have been published and are used in functional brain imaging studies. In this paper, we present a comparison and crossvalidation of the two most widely used coregistration routines (Friston et al., 1995; Woods et al., 1993). Several transformations were applied to high-- resolution anatomical MR images to generate simulated PET images so that the exact (rigid body) transformations between each MR image and its associated simulated PET images were known. The estimation error of a coregistration in relation to the known transformation allows a comparison of the performance of different coregistration routines. Under the assumption that the simulated PET images embody the salient features of real PET images with respect to coregistration, this study shows that the routines examined r...
The visual cortex is sensitive to emotional stimuli. This sensitivity is typically assumed to arise when amygdala modulates visual cortex via backwards connections. Using human fMRI, we compared dynamic causal connectivity models of sensitivity with fearful faces. This model comparison tested whether amygdala modulates distinct cortical areas, depending on dynamic or static face presentation. The ventral temporal fusiform face area showed sensitivity to fearful expressions in static faces. However, for dynamic faces, we found fear sensitivity in dorsal motion-sensitive areas within hMT+/V5 and superior temporal sulcus. The model with the greatest evidence included connections modulated by dynamic and static fear from amygdala to dorsal and ventral temporal areas, respectively. According to this functional architecture, amygdala could enhance encoding of fearful expression movements from video and the form of fearful expressions from static images. The amygdala may therefore optimize visual encoding of socially charged and salient information.
This paper describes a variational free-energy formulation of (partially observable) Markov decision problems in decision making under uncertainty. We show that optimal control can be cast as active inference. In active inference, both action and posterior beliefs about hidden states minimise a free energy bound on the negative log-likelihood of observed states, under a generative model. In this setting, reward or cost functions are absorbed into prior beliefs about state transitions and terminal states. Effectively, this converts optimal control into a pure inference problem, enabling the application of standard Bayesian filtering techniques. We then consider optimal trajectories that rest on posterior beliefs about hidden states in the future. Crucially, this entails modelling control as a hidden state that endows the generative model with a representation of agency. This leads to a distinction between models with and without inference on hidden control states; namely, agency-free and agency-based models, respectively.