Publications

Active inference, stressors, and psychological trauma: A neuroethological model of (mal)adaptive explore-exploit dynamics in ecological context

Abstract This paper offers a formal account of emotional inference and stress-related behaviour, using the notion of active inference. We formulate responses to stressful scenarios in terms of Bayesian belief-updating and subsequent policy selection; namely, planning as (active) inference. Using a minimal model of how creatures or subjects account for their sensations (and subsequent action), we deconstruct the sequences of belief updating and behaviour that underwrite stress-related responses – and simulate the aberrant responses of the sort seen in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Crucially, the model used for belief-updating generates predictions in multiple (exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive) modalities, to provide an integrated account of evidence accumulation and multimodal integration that has consequences for both motor and autonomic responses. The ensuing phenomenology speaks to many constructs in the ecological and clinical literature on stress, which we unpack with reference to simulated inference processes and accompanying neuronal responses. A key insight afforded by this formal approach rests on the trade-off between the epistemic affordance of certain cues (that resolve uncertainty about states of affairs in the environment) and the consequences of epistemic foraging (that may be in conflict with the instrumental or pragmatic value of ‘fleeing’ or ‘freezing’). Starting from first principles, we show how this trade-off is nuanced by prior (subpersonal) beliefs about the outcomes of behaviour – beliefs that, when held with unduly high precision, can lead to (Bayes optimal) responses that closely resemble PTSD.

Planning and navigation as active inference

This paper introduces an active inference formulation of planning and navigation. It illustrates how the exploitation–exploration dilemma is dissolved by acting to minimise uncertainty (i.e. expected surprise or free energy). We use simulations of a maze problem to illustrate how agents can solve quite complicated problems using context sensitive prior preferences to form subgoals. Our focus is on how epistemic behaviour—driven by novelty and the imperative to reduce uncertainty about the world—contextualises pragmatic or goal-directed behaviour. Using simulations, we illustrate the underlying process theory with synthetic behavioural and electrophysiological responses during exploration of a maze and subsequent navigation to a target location. An interesting phenomenon that emerged from the simulations was a putative distinction between 'place cells'—that fire when a subgoal is reached—and 'path cells'—that fire until a subgoal is reached.

A World unto Itself: Human Communication as Active Inference

Work in developmental psychology suggests that humans are predisposed to align their mental states with other individuals. This manifests principally in cooperative communication, that is, intentional communication geared towards aligning mental states. This viewpoint has received ample empirical support. However, this view lacks a formal grounding, and provides no precise neuroscientific hypotheses. To remedy this, we suggest an active inference approach to cooperative communication. We suggest that humans appear to possess an evolved adaptive prior belief that their mental states are aligned with those of conspecifics. Cooperative communication emerges as the principal means to gather evidence for this belief. Our approach has implications for the study of the usage, ontogeny, and cultural evolution of human communication.

Systems Approach to Intrusive Experiences

12. Reduced P300 Responses Are Associated With Altered Excitatory and Inhibitory Cell Function in High-Risk Individuals who Convert to Psychosis: Insights From the NAPLS-2 Sample

Voxel-Based Morphometry of Herpes Simplex Encephalitis

Markov blankets in the brain

Recent characterisations of self-organising systems depend upon the presence of a 'Markov blanket': a statistical boundary that mediates the interactions between the inside and outside of a system. We leverage this idea to provide an analysis of partitions in neuronal systems. This is applicable to brain architectures at multiple scales, enabling partitions into single neurons, brain regions, and brain-wide networks. This treatment is based upon the canonical micro-circuitry used in empirical studies of effective connectivity, so as to speak directly to practical applications. The notion of effective connectivity depends upon the dynamic coupling between functional units, whose form recapitulates that of a Markov blanket at each level of analysis. The nuance afforded by partitioning neural systems in this way highlights certain limitations of 'modular' perspectives of brain function that only consider a single level of description.

‘Seeing the Dark’: Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference

One of the central claims of the Self-model Theory of Subjectivity is that the experience of being someone – even in a minimal form – arises through a transparent phenomenal self-model, which itself can in principle be reduced to brain processes. Here, we consider whether it is possible to distinguish between phenomenally transparent and opaque states in terms of active inference. We propose a relationship of phenomenal opacity to expected uncertainty or precision; i.e., the capacity for introspective attention and implicit mental action. Thus we associate introspective attention with the deployment of 'precision' that may render the perceptual evidence (for action) opaque, while treating transparency as a necessary aspect of beliefs about action, i.e., 'what I am' doing. We conclude by proposing how we may have to nuance our conception of minimal phenomenal selfhood and agency in light of this active inference conception of transparency-opacity.

Path integrals, particular kinds, and strange things

This paper describes a path integral formulation of the free energy principle. The ensuing account expresses the paths or trajectories that a particle takes as it evolves over time. The main results are a method or principle of least action that can be used to emulate the behaviour of particles in open exchange with their external milieu. Particles are defined by a particular partition, in which internal states are individuated from external states by active and sensory blanket states. The variational principle at hand allows one to interpret internal dynamics - of certain kinds of particles - as inferring external states that are hidden behind blanket states. We consider different kinds of particles, and to what extent they can be imbued with an elementary form of inference or sentience. Specifically, we consider the distinction between dissipative and conservative particles, inert and active particles and, finally, ordinary and strange particles. Strange particles can be described as inferring their own actions, endowing them with apparent autonomy or agency. In short - of the kinds of particles afforded by a particular partition - strange kinds may be apt for describing sentient behaviour.

Active inference, preference learning and adaptive behaviour

Abstract The ability to adapt to a changing environment underwrites sentient behaviour e.g., wearing a raincoat when walking in the rain but removing it when indoors. In such instances, agents act to satisfy some preferred mode of behaviour that leads to predictable states necessary for survival, i.e., states that are characteristic of that agent. In this chapter, we describe how active inference agents, equipped with preference learning, can exhibit these distinct behavioural modes – influenced by environment dynamics – to aptly trade-off between preference satisfaction and exploration. We validate this in a modified OpenAI Gym FrozenLake environment (without any extrinsic signal) with and without volatility under a fixed model of the environment. In a static (i.e., without volatility) environment, preference-learning agents accumulate confident (Bayesian) beliefs about their behaviour and act to satisfy them. In contrast, volatile dynamics led to preference uncertainty and exploratory behaviour. This demonstrates that active inference agents, equipped with preference learning, have the appropriate machinery to (i) engage in adaptive behaviour under appropriate levels of volatility, and (ii) learn context-dependent subjective preferences.

Dynamic causal modeling

No abstract is provided for this article.

Are there reading specific brain areas? A meta-analysis of PET data from 72 subjects

Human visual exploration reduces uncertainty about the sensed world

In previous papers, we introduced a normative scheme for scene construction and epistemic (visual) searches based upon active inference. This scheme provides a principled account of how people decide where to look, when categorising a visual scene based on its contents. In this paper, we use active inference to explain the visual searches of normal human subjects; enabling us to answer some key questions about visual foraging and salience attribution. First, we asked whether there is any evidence for ‘epistemic foraging’; i.e. exploration that resolves uncertainty about a scene. In brief, we used Bayesian model comparison to compare Markov decision process (MDP) models of scan-paths that did–and did not–contain the epistemic, uncertainty-resolving imperatives for action selection. In the course of this model comparison, we discovered that it was necessary to include non-epistemic (heuristic) policies to explain observed behaviour (e.g., a reading-like strategy that involved scanning from left to right). Despite this use of heuristic policies, model comparison showed that there is substantial evidence for epistemic foraging in the visual exploration of even simple scenes. Second, we compared MDP models that did–and did not–allow for changes in prior expectations over successive blocks of the visual search paradigm. We found that implicit prior beliefs about the speed and accuracy of visual searches changed systematically with experience. Finally, we characterised intersubject variability in terms of subject-specific prior beliefs. Specifically, we used canonical correlation analysis to see if there were any mixtures of prior expectations that could predict between-subject differences in performance; thereby establishing a quantitative link between different behavioural phenotypes and Bayesian belief updating. We demonstrated that better scene categorisation performance is consistently associated with lower reliance on heuristics; i.e., a greater use of a generative model of the scene to direct its exploration.

Neuronal models of ensemble dynamics

An active inference approach to semiotics

This chapter revisits seminal work on (Peircean) semiotics under the auspices of active inference, a theory of adaptive, belief-based behavior that has cast perception, learning, and action as forms of (variational or Bayesian) inference. We argue that active inference features a semiotic structure that admits a partial integration and formalization of semiotic concepts, notably including abductive inference, Peircean interpretants, and the icon/index/symbol triad. The resulting framework may motivate interdisciplinary treatments of semiotics in the sciences of life and mind – namely, neurosemiotics – to help understand the nature of meaning in relation to neuronal processes and accompanying perceptual inference.

Dopaminergic modulation of impaired cognitive activation in the anterior cingulate cortex in schizophrenia

No abstract is provided for this article.

Detecting bilateral abnormalities with voxel-based morphometry

In this article we describe a new method, using SPM99, that searches explicitly for bilateral structural abnormalities. Children with bilateral pathology have a poorer prognosis than children with unilateral damage. After brain injury or disease in childhood, it is thought that rescue of function is only possible if the neuronal substrates of that function are preserved and operational in at least one hemisphere [Vargha-Khadem and Mishkin, 1997]. If this is the case, the detection of bilateral abnormalities would greatly facilitate more accurate prognosis in children with brain injury or developmental disorders. We have therefore developed a technique to detect bilateral abnormalities that uses conjunction analysis with voxel based morphometry. It is illustrated using a group of patients with bilateral hypoxic-ischaemic damage to the hippocampus. The approach is shown to have enhanced specificity and sensitivity relative to conventional unilateral characterisations.

Anticipation in architectural experience: a computational neurophenomenology for architecture?

The perceptual experience of architecture is enacted by the sensory and motor system. When we act, we change the perceived environment according to a set of expectations that depend on our body and the built environment. The continuous process of collecting sensory information is thus based on bodily affordances. Affordances characterize the fit between the physical structure of the body and capacities for movement in the built environment. Since little has been done regarding the role of architectural design in the emergence of perceptual experience on a neuronal level, this paper offers a first step towards the role of architectural design in perceptual experience. An approach to synthesize concepts from computational neuroscience with architectural phenomenology into a computational neurophenomenology is considered. The outcome is a framework under which studies of architecture and cognitive neuroscience can be cast.