Abstract We analyse the role of economic and security considerations in bilateral trade agreements. We use the pre‐World War I period to test whether trade agreements are governed by standard gravity variables, or by instead—or in addition—geopolitical factors. While we like others find support for standard gravity variables, we also find that defence pacts boost the probability of trade agreements by as much as 20 percentage points. Our estimates imply that were the U.S. to alienate its geopolitical allies, the likelihood and benefits of successful bilateral agreements would fall significantly. Trade creation from an agreement between the U.S. and E.U. countries would decline by about 0.6 per cent of total U.S. exports.

This lecture discusses the work by the Estonian economist Ragnar Nurkse (1907-1959). It focuses on the early Nurkse, who was concerned with exchange rates, capital flows and what today we call the international financial architecture. It asks how many of the conclusions of International Currency Experience [Nurkse, R. (1944). International Currency Experience. Geneva: League of Nations.] survive. How many of Nurkse's points about the interwar gold standard are confirmed by subsequent scholarship? How many of his points are still relevant to the international monetary problems of today?

Distinguishing between two different schools of thought that are named after two different universities, Harvard and Berkeley, the article looks at the evolution, past and future, of the international monetary system. While the empirical view holds that the system will remain unipolar and dollar-based, the opposing view uses history to contend that it may potenially evolve away from the dollar into a multipolar system.

[H]istory … suggests taking more seriously concerns about inequality and, specifically, the resentment and alienation of once-privileged groups who feel left behind.

An effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is sometimes suggested, will be to reverse the secular trend toward questioning the value of scientific research and expertise. We analyze this hypothesis by examining how exposure to previous epidemics affected the confidence of individuals in science and scientists. Consistent with theory and evidence that attitudes are durably formed when individuals are in their impressionable years between the ages of 18 and 25, we focus on people who were exposed to epidemics in their country of residence at this stage of the life course. Combining data from a 2018 Wellcome Trust survey of more than 70,000 individuals in 160 countries with data on global epidemics since 1970, we show that such exposure has no impact on views of science as an endeavor or on opinions of whether the study of disease is properly an aspect of science, but that it significantly reduces confidence in scientists and the benefits of their work. These findings are robust to a variety of controls, empirical methods and sensitivity checks. We suggest some implications for how scientific findings are communicated and for how scientists seeking to inform and influence public opinion should position themselves in the public sphere.