We examine the impact of renminbi revaluation on foreign firm valuations, considering two surprise announcements of changes in China's exchange rate policy in 2005 and 2010 and employing data on some 6,000 firms in 44 economies. Stock returns rise with renminbi revaluation expectations. This reaction appears to reflect a combination of improvements in general market sentiment and specific trade effects. Expected renminbi appreciation has a positive effect on firms exporting to China but a negative impact on those providing inputs for the country's processing exports. Stock prices rise for firms competing with China in their home market but fall for firms importing Chinese products with large imported-input content. There is also some evidence that expected renminbi appreciation reduces the valuation of financially-constrained firms, presumably because appreciation implies reduced Chinese purchases of foreign securities. The results carry over when we consider ten instances of market-perceived changes in prospective Chinese currency policy

It almost seems as if the European economic model is continuously experiencing an existential crisis.

Abstract We compare the architecture and governance of financial supervision across countries. We find that countries where the supervisor is the central bank, or where it is independent of government, have more conservatively regulated financial systems. Nonperforming loans are lower in countries where the supervisor is independent, while capital ratios are higher where the central bank, rather than another agency of government, is the lead supervisor. At the same time, some measures of bank credit to the economy are significantly lower both where the supervisor is independent and where the lead supervisor is the central bank. Insofar as the same institutional arrangements that confer greater stability, such as higher capital ratios and lower nonperforming loans, also limit the provision of credit to the economy, countries face a tradeoff. That different countries have been moving in different directions in restructuring their supervisory arrangements should not be surprising insofar as they have different objectives for their financial sector.

New data documenting E uropean bond issues in major financial centres from 1919 to 1932 show that conditions in international capital markets and not just in borrowing countries are important for explaining the surge and reversal in capital flows. In particular, the sharp increase in stock market volatility in the major financial centres at the end of the 1920s figured importantly in the decline in foreign lending. This article draws parallels with Europe after 2008.

In his speech at the Gaidar Forum 2016 author for the most urgent problems of the world economy. According to him, will be observed the acceleration of growth in developed countries and slower - in developing countries. Consider the economic difficulties that could face the major players in the global economic field -. United States, EU, Russia, China, Brazil, Turkey, etc. However, the author believes that the current economic situation is unlikely to result in a massive political backlash.

An eminent economist once observed that “(t)he dramatic mod-ernization of the Asian economies ranks alongside the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution as one of the most important develop-ments in economic history. ” The economist in question was —mem-bers of this audience will have guessed—Larry Summers. He was referring to the rapid economic growth of the late 20th and early 21st centuries and to Asian economies other than Japan. In these remarks I want to reflect not on the familiar if still contested issue of what explains this “Asian Miracle ” but on whether it can con-tinue at anything approaching the same pace (although the two issues are obviously connected). The question is whether the fast-growing economies of East Asia are now poised to slow down. It is whether they will fall prey to what is referred to as the “middle-income trap.” History helps to shed light on this question. In joint work with Donghyun Park of the Asian Development Bank and Kwanho Shin

The following sections are included:The Global Reserve SystemThe Emergency Provision of LiquidityRegulating Capital FlowsThe Role of the IMFConclusionReferences

Hans-Joachim Voth last updated: 14.02.09 Description: Financial crises are a recurrent feature in modern economies. They were as common in the 19th century as they are today. This course examines financial crises, banking collapses, and credit crunches over the last 200 years. Starting with the subprime crisis, it analyses underlying factors that generate instability in financial markets. Using a mix of recent and historical episodes, the course examines the causes and consequences of banking crises and of asset price bubbles, and concludes with a discussion of policy implications.

We examine the impact of the Great Depression on the share of votes for right-wing anti-system parties in elections in the 1920s and 1930s. We confirm the existence of a link between political extremism and economic hard times as captured by growth or contraction of the economy. What mattered was not simply growth at the time of the election but cumulative growth performance. But the effect of the Depression on support for right-wing anti-system parties was not equally powerful under all economic, political and social circumstances. It was greatest in countries with relatively short histories of democracy, with existing extremist parties, and with electoral systems that created low hurdles to parliamentary representation. Above all, it was greatest where depressed economic conditions were allowed to persist.

If U.S. President Clinton’s treasury secretary Robert Rubin is responsible for coining the phrase “international financial architecture” in a speech at the Brookings Institution in 1998, I deserve some of the blame for popularizing it. 2 I used it in the title of my 1999 book, Toward a New International Financial Architecture, published by the Peterson Institute. 3 I say blame because the term architecture conveys a rather misleading sense of the nature of the process. Mirriam-Webster’s on-line dictionary defines architecture as “a unifying or coherent form or structure” (as in “this novel displays an admirable architecture”). 4 In other words, the term implies a unity and coherence that financial markets, institutions and policies do not possess. Alternatively, Mirriam-Webster defines “architecture” as “a formation or construction resulting from or as if from a conscious act.” But many of our international arrangements have, in fact, evolved as unintended consequences of past actions rather than as the result of anyone’s conscious act, “as if” or otherwise. The post-Bretton Woods exchange rate system, starting in the 1970s and extending through the present day, was more the product of the inability of policy makers to agree on the form that the exchange rate system should take than the result of any conscious decision.